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2ABSTRACT
Olazábal, Ann M.:  ANALYST AND BROKER LIABILITY UNDER 10(B) FOR BIASED 
STOCK RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the aftermath of recent Wall Street scandals, class action suits have been brought by 
thousands of investors against securities analysts and their broker-dealer employers, 
based upon stock research and recommendations that were allegedly biased by such 
conflicts of interest as analysts’ ownership interest in researched stocks or other 
relationships between analysts and issuers, and the fact analysts’ compensation was tied 
to their ability to generate investment banking business from issuers.  This work 
exhaustively analyzes federal 10(b) liability for misleading representations and omissions 
in this context, through the prism of existing general securities fraud precedent, scant 
existing authority in cases involving communications by analysts and other non-issuers, 
and the initial district court opinions that have been generated by pending suits.  The 
author identifies the best arguments in support of and against analyst liability in the case 
of tainted research, opining that reliance and loss causation will serve as the biggest
battlegrounds for the ongoing litigation, and ultimately concluding that in many of the 
pending cases the alleged facts will suffice to make a prima facie case for jury 
consideration.
1The “fundamental purpose . . .[of the federal securities laws is] to substitute a philosophy of full 
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business 
ethics in the securities industry.”1
Since the Great Crash of 1929, the stock market has been the stuff of legends and 
colorful monikers.  The Sixties were the “Go-Go Years”;2 they were followed by the 
Seventies’ “May Day” brokerage commission deregulation.3 October 1997 brought
“Black Monday,” when the Dow fell 23% in one day.4 In the film Wall Street, which
portrayed high finance in the Reagan era, fictional corporate raider Gordon Gecko 
famously uttered the me-decade’s credo: “Greed is good.”5  That bull market continued, 
in fits and starts, until the turn of the millennium – the years 1999-2000 – and what now 
may be called the era “Before Spitzer.”6  It was in those days that CNBC and the 
Financial News Network were born, the day trading phenomenon emerged, and the most 
recent unsavory view of Wall Street’s underbelly had not yet been exposed. 7
1 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).  Despite this prescription, one U.S. 
District Court Judge has taken the position in the group of cases before him that it is not the role of the law 
to “punish breaches of business ethics” in a securities fraud case involving allegedly undisclosed research 
analyst bias.  In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 289 F. Supp.2d 416, 418 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
2 JOHN BROOKS, THE GO-GO YEARS (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1973).  
3 See ALEX BERENSON, THE NUMBER:  HOW THE DRIVE FOR QUARTERLY EARNINGS CORRUPTED WALL 
STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA, 65-67 (Random House, 2003).
4 Id. at 78.
5 WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox, 1987).
6
 Patrick McGeehan, The Women of Wall Street Get Their Day in Court, N.Y.TIMES (July 11, 2004) at 
Section 3, Sunday Business, Page 1 (discussing days before recent Wall Street scandals prompted by New 
York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer’s investigations, when large scale gender discrimination claims against 
major brokerage houses were brewing).
7
 Wall Street has been roiled by numerous scandals over the last two years.  See, e.g., Ann Davis, Wall 
Street Firms Face Scrutiny Over Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2004), at A1 (describing NASD and 
SEC investigations into conflicts of interest in marketing hedge funds); Susan Pulliam, “Pipe” Stock Deals 
are Reviewed, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2004), at C1 (reporting on SEC’s inquiry into hedge funds’ alleged use 
of inside information to profit ahead of “private investment in public equity” deals at expense of other 
investors); Aaron Lucchetti, Price Markups Get NASD Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (June 18, 2004), at C4 
(detailing 20 separate investigations into whether brokerages charged excessive markups on investors’ 
transactions in corporate and municipal bonds); Ann Davis, NASD Scrutinizes Conflicts in Bankers’ 
2Before Spitzer, Wall Street was rife with conflicts of interest percolating just 
below the surface.  Of these, perhaps the biggest was the conflict posed by big brokerage 
houses’ investment banking divisions influencing, or even driving, analysts’ 
recommendations and ratings, which theretofore had been dictated by independent stock 
research and personal judgment.  Many analysts and their broker-dealer employers were 
too cozy with issuers, often allowing them to preview and revise research reports before 
they were made public.  Investment banking deals were handed to the firm that could 
deliver the most convincing ratings from its research department.  Powerful, so-called 
“media darling” analysts’ astronomical paychecks turn out to have been tied to their 
ability to generate lucrative investment banking deals.  Analysts, bank executives, and 
often the banks’ proprietary trading funds owned stocks the firms publicly pushed, 
allowing them to profit and profit well from the price inflation that accompanied their 
consistently bullish Strong Buy and Market Outperform recommendations.  Even the 
rating system itself was suspect; almost no covered stock was given a “sell” or even 
“neutral” rating.8 Savvy institutional investors may have taken analysts’ stock 
‘Fairness Opinions,’ WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2004), at A1 (discussing investigation into financial incentives 
of bankers and company executives in pushing through mergers and acquisitions); Deborah Solomon, SEC 
Blasts Big Board Oversight of ‘Specialist’ Trading Firms, WALL ST. J. (November 3, 2003), at A1 
(reporting on two related conflicts of interest:  market specialists’ trading ahead of investors to the tune of 
$128 million in profits for their own accounts and interpositioning that cost investors another $27 million, 
and the NYSE’s lax discipline thereof, perhaps due to its regulatory arm’s own conflicts of interest in 
prosecuting violations); Jonathan D. Glater, First Wave of Suits Hits Mutual Fund Companies, N.Y. TIMES, 
(September 24, 2003), at C1 (describing investor class action suits arising out of New York Attorney 
General Eliot Spitzer’s investigation into market timing and after hours trading at mutual funds, which 
preferred certain institutional investors over individuals); Randall Smith, New Inquiries Are Targeting IPO 
‘Spinning’, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2003), at C1 (portraying practice of “spinning,” or selective allocation by 
investment banks of lucrative new shares to other issuer executives, as latest regulatory scandal facing Wall 
Street); Jeanne Cummings, Rapid Exit:  SEC’s Pitt Resigns Amid Controversy Over Webster Job, WALL 
ST. J. (November 6, 2002), at A1 (reporting on uproar over Harvey Pitt’s appointment of William Webster 
to the public accounting oversight board with knowledge of suspected accounting fraud at U.S. 
Technologies, where Webster had served as head of the audit committee). 
8 See Ann Morales Olazábal and Thomas R. Robinson, Securities Analysts and “Tainted” Research:  What 
Regulations and Professional Standards Apply? 1 B US L. BRIEF 32 (Spring 2004) (describing tainted 
3recommendations with the proverbial grain of salt, but for the most part small investors 
were woefully unaware of the now-obvious conflicts of interest inherent in these 
supposedly independent stock recommendations and research.9
Of course, as history goes, all that came to a grinding halt when the bubble burst 
and the popular media and Spitzer finally got a handle on the extent of the scheme.10
After telling email evidence11 appeared to reveal that some analysts’ publicly stated 
opinions did not reflect their unbiased personal judgments regarding the stocks being 
touted by their firms, enforcement actions were filed,12 and a $1.4 billion “global” 
settlement was reached between federal and state regulators and ten of the largest broker 
dealers, purporting to reform investment practices.13  In addition to assessing fines and 
investor restitution payments, the settlement severed links between investment banking 
and analysts (including compensation related ties), banned “spinning” of IPOs, required 
research scandal in detail).  For a particularly cynical description of the analyst bias phenomenon, see
ARIANNA HUFFINGTON, PIGS AT THE TROUGH 154-168 (2003). 
9
 Former Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Arthur Levitt, recounts his unsuccessful 
attempts to get the media to assist in getting the message across to small investors across the country, who 
apparently were enthralled by analysts’ televised recommendations and unfamiliar with the serious 
conflicts of interest involved in some of their recommendations.  ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET 
70-77 (2002).
10
 An early widely-read magazine questioned Wall Street research’s objectivity in the Internet sector, as 
part of a feature styled “dot.com Ethics.”  Erick Schonfeld, The High Price of Research, FORTUNE (March 
20, 2000), at 118.  Noted financial reporter Gretchen Morgenson sounded the alarm on the eve of the 
millennium.  Gretchen Morgenson, How Did So Many Get it So Wrong? N. Y. TIMES (December 31, 
2000), at Section 3, page 1.  Eliot Spitzer’s renowned investigation into analyst bias began with Merrill 
Lynch, and resulted not only into publication on the Internet of the Dinallo Affidavit, detailing analysts’ 
and firms’ misconduct, a  but also a stream of similar investigations by other attorneys general and federal 
and industry regulators.  John Cassidy, The Investigation; How Eliot Spitzer Humbled Wall Street, THE 
NEW YORKER (April 7, 2003).  The Dinallo Affidavit – which was attached to Spitzer’s office’s application 
for an ex parte order under New York’s Martin Act permitting the Attorney General to launch a public 
investigation of Merrill Lynch, with public hearings, and public disclosure of documents – is available at 
http://www.news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ merrilllynch/nyagmerrill0402aff.pdf
11
 Dinallo affidavit, supra note n-1.
12
 Investors’ attempt to intervene or to file amicus briefs in this litigation was unsuccessful.  SEC v. Bear,
Stearns & Co. Inc., et al., 03 Civ. 2937 (WHP) etc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14611 (S.D.N.Y. August 25, 
2003). 
13
 Press Release, Securities & Exchange Commission, SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD, NSAA, NYSE 
and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to Reform Investment Practices (December 20, 2002) 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-179.htm (Last modified December 20, 2002).
4firms to fund independent research for five years, and mandated public disclosure of all 
analysts’ recommendations, ratings, and price targets.14  Participants generally heralded 
the settlement as “the dawn of a new day on Wall Street.”15  Subsequently, NASD and 
NYSE rules were amended, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act16 resulted in new rules and 
statutes seeking to eliminate some of the specific practices that resulted in so called 
“tainted” research.17 With the question of civil liability to investors as yet unaddressed, 
the private lawsuits had already begun to be filed.
This paper addresses analysts’ and their employing broker-dealer firms’ liability 
for securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 
10b-5,18 arising out of so-called “tainted” research reports and stock recommendations19
14 Id. 
15 Id., quoting Chris Bruenn, president of the North American Securities Administrators Association.   Cf. 
Gina N. Scianni, Note, From Behind the Corporate Veil:  The Outing of Wwall Street’s Investment Banking 
Scandals – Why Recent Regulations Might not Mean the Dawn of a New Day,  9 FORDHAM J. CORP. FIN 
LAW 257 (2003).
16
 Public Company Accounting and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (popularly known as the "Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 2002"), Pub. L. 107-204, Title VIII, 116 Stat. 745, 801, codified in scattered parts of 28 
U.S.C., was signed into law by President George W. Bush on July 30, 2002.
17
 Olazábal and Robinson, supra note *.
18
 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5, respectively.  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
stated that “the scope of Rule 10b-5 is coextensive with the coverage of § 10(b),” citing United States v. 
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651(1997) and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), and therefore, 
the Court itself adopts the use of “§ 10(b) to refer to both the statutory provision and the Rule.”  S.E.C. v. 
Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 816 n.1 (2002).  This Article follows suit.
19
 A number of noted practitioners and scholars in the field have introduced the subject, but none has yet 
plumbed its depths or considered preliminary rulings in the cases.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Security Analyst 
Litigation, N.Y.L.J. (September 20, 2001), Corporate Update Section at 5; Richard A. Rosen, Liability for 
Optimistic Research Reports Prepared by Securities Analysts, 16 INSIGHTS 9 (April 2002); Jacob H. 
Zamansky, Assessing Analysts' Liability for Securities Fraud, N.Y.L.J. (January 3, 2002) Outside Counsel 
section at 1; Stanley S. Arkin, Analysts' Conflicts of Interest: Where's the Crime? N.Y.L.J. (February 14, 
2002), Business Crime section at 3.  See also Jill I. Gross, Securities Analysts’ Undisclosed Conflicts of 
Interest:  Unfair Dealing or Securities Fraud?  2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 631.  The subject has also 
spawned some interest among law students.  See Karen Contoudis, Note, Analyst Conflicts of Interests:  
Are the NASD and NYSE Rules Enough?  8 FORDHAM J. CORP. FIN LAW 123 (2003); Robert P. Sieland, 
Note, Caveat Emptor!  After All the Regulatory Hoopla, Analysts Remain Conflicted on Wall Street, 2003 
U. ILL. L. REV. 531; Kelly S. Sullivan, Comment, Serving Two Masters:  Securities Analyst Liability and 
Regulation in the Face of Pervasive Conflicts of Interest, 70 UMKC L. REV. 415 (Winter 2001); Jaimee L. 
Campbell, Comment, Analyst Liability and the Internet Bubble: the Morgan Stanley/Mary Meeker Cases, 7 
FORDHAM J. CORP. FIN LAW 265 (2001).
5published during the stock market bubble that existed at the turn of the millennium.20
The private class action suits brought in attempt to redress this perceived systematic 
conflict of interest, broadly speaking, have been referred to as “analyst bias” cases.21
The pending analyst bias suits are naturally many and varied both substantively 
and procedurally, depending on such critical details as when the plaintiffs sued, which 
defendants and which stocks were involved, what level of knowledge the analyst may 
have had about the actual state of affairs of the given issuer and what type of relationship 
he or she may have had with the issuer, whether the analyst and/or broker-dealer had an 
ownership position in the stock covered, what evidence there was of the research-
investment banking conflict of interest at the relevant brokerage and what publicity it 
received in the media and when, whether the analyst or broker-dealer obviously profited 
from the optimistic recommendations by way of sales of ownership interests in the 
recommended stock, whether the plaintiffs obtained access to internal emails or other 
communications revealing the “falsity” of an analyst’s publicly rendered opinions (either 
before or after filing suit), whether the publicly disseminated email evidence treated the 
stocks of which plaintiffs complained, and so on.  
No easy or general conclusion can be drawn about whether the broad group of 
fact scenarios loosely headed “analyst bias” may give rise to 10(b) liability.  Instead, each 
20
 Many books have already been written about this most recent market bubble, e.g., JOHN CASSIDY, 
DOT.CON:  HOW AMERICA LOST ITS MIND AND ITS MONEY IN THE INTERNET ERA (2003); KEVIN HASSETT,
BUBBLEOLOGY (2002); ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000), including numerous 
memoirs from various perspectives.  See, e.g., DAVID DENBY, AMERICAN SUCKER (2004)(investor); J. 
DAVID KUO, DOT.BOMB: MY DAYS AND NIGHTS AT AN INTERNET GOLIATH (2001) (executive at infamous 
e-tailer Value America); MICHAEL WOLFF, BURN RATE (1999) (Internet entrepreneur).  Denby, an 
accomplished writer and journalist reflects on being caught up in the frenzy, notably detailing 
conversations with Merrill Lynch “superstar” analyst Henry Blodget and various tech stock “gurus” 
throughout the bubble period and after.
21 See, e.g., Dennis J. Block and Jonathan M. Hoff, Mergers and Acquisitions: SLUSA Preclusion of Claims 
Against Brokers, 227 N.Y.L.J. 5 (April 25, 2002).
6case necessarily involves ad hoc examination of its facts and analysis – through the 
lenses of the common law of 10(b) law, the heightened pleading standards of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, and federal class action jurisprudence – to ascertain 
whether the given suit should survive dismissal, should be certified as a class, and 
ultimately should go to a jury for determination.  There is scant case law directly on 
point; the pre-existing general case law addressing 10(b) may raise more questions than it 
answers in this context.  This is because this particular system-wide conflict of interest 
and its unique juxtaposition on a bubble market and securities analysts’ unusually 
widespread visibility together create a situation that could not possibly have been 
contemplated by the drafters of the federal securities laws or the courts that have since 
implied the 10(b) cause of action and explored its contours in different fact settings over 
the years.22
A good place to start is with the basic elements of the claim.  To state a cause of 
action under §10(b), a plaintiff must show that “the defendant, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities, made a materially false statement or omitted a material 
fact, with scienter, and that plaintiff's reliance on defendant's action caused [plaintiff] 
22
 Not so long ago, judges may have been predisposed to make assumptions about the role of analysts in the 
financial markets that may not have held up during the recent bubble economy.  For example, the Second 
Circuit in 1993 had the following to say about analysts:  “… the function of financial reporters and security 
analysts is to determine the truth about the affairs of publicly traded companies. Few reporters or analysts 
would knowingly abet a fraud, and many will detect and reveal a corporation's efforts to use them as a 
channel for fraudulent statements.”  In re Time Warner Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 1993).  
Similarly, in 1992 a California district judge remarked, apparently as a matter of common knowledge, that 
an analyst will be more objective than a corporate officer in making predictions about issuers’ future 
performance, and so, more inclined to publish accurate research because “the analyst’s reputation and 
livelihood depend solely on the analyst’s ability to be correct.”  In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 
1471, 1481 (N.D. Cal. 1992).  And see generally Joseph Nocera, Wall Street on the Run, FORTUNE (June 
14, 2004), at 106 (discussing why traditional business model for research departments now must drastically 
change).
7injury.”23 Some have opined that analyst bias cases fit this mold well.24  Others are not 
so sure.25
This Article uses these quite familiar elements of a securities fraud claim as its 
roadmap for consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of the analyst bias cases.  As a 
preliminary matter, Section I addresses the “in connection with” requirement and the 
substantial procedural effect its application has had in this context.  Section II then
reviews the basic requirement of a false statement or omission and the effect of 
characterizing analyst bias as one or the other.  Section III assesses the materiality of 
analysts’ ratings and recommendations, as well as their failure to disclose various 
conflicts of interest.  Section IV takes a close look at the scienter requirement in this 
setting.  Section V explores reliance, and presumptions thereof, in analyst bias cases.  
Section VI addresses loss causation, and Section VII damages.  As a brief concluding 
matter, Section VIII surveys the relevant statute of limitations and the district court split 
on the issue.  
These Sections generally consist of multiple parts.  First is a discussion of the 
basic law of the subject element of the 10(b) securities fraud claim, with emphasis on 
Second Circuit and other relevant general precedent that will apply to the analyst bias 
23
 Lawrence v. Cohn, 325 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) quoting Ganino v. Citizens Util. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 
161 (2d Cir. 2000); and see Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 534 (2d Cir. 1999) (alterations 
in original), quoting Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 264.
24 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 18, at 661; Phillip Ballard Kennedy, Note, Investment Banking Conflicts: 
Research  Analysts  and IPO Allocations,  N.C. BANKING INST. 199, 219-223 (April 2003); Zamansky, 
supra note 18.  Mr. Zamansky is a noted member of the plaintiffs’ bar, representing allegedly defrauded 
investors in class action suits.
25 See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 18; John F. X. Peloso and Francis S. Chlapowski, Loss Causation: Who Was 
Responsible for the Market Bubble?  N.Y.L.J. (August 21, 2003), at 3.  Mr. Rosen as well as Messrs. 
Peloso and Chlapowski are defense attorneys.  See also John C. Coffee, Jr., supra note 18 (rendering a 
more mixed opinion on viability of private suits alleging analyst bias under 10(b), but framing the question 
thus:  “Should the courts extend the already considerable reach of Rule 10b-5 to encompass liability for 
patently silly investment advice, largely on the ground that analysts were compensated to promote deals?”, 
and therefore reflecting a defense-oriented bias in this particular context).
8class action suits.  As applicable, each Section then includes in-depth factual and legal 
analysis of any scant precedent that existed on the topic of analyst and broker liability for 
research reports prior to the current spate of litigation, as well as analogous case law 
involving others who gave biased investment advice, extracting those nuggets of helpful 
reasoning or precedent that might impact the pending cases.  And, where possible, each 
Section analyzes the current state of the pending class action suits, looking at the salient 
legal and relevant procedural issues raised.  Ultimately, in each Section the author seeks 
to identify the best arguments in support of and against analyst liability in the case of 
tainted research.  
Finally, this Article reconciles the interim conclusions on each element and 
concludes, in Section IX, with a discussion of the largest issues to be determined in 
pending litigation and the general outlook for analysts and broker-dealers still facing 
years of front line litigation and appeals on this topic.
Section I - “In Connection With”
The language of 10(b) requires that any fraud or deception prosecuted thereunder 
have been committed “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.”  This 
element has been interpreted uniformly to exclude as plaintiffs in 10(b) cases those who 
chose to hold their securities in response to defendants’ misrepresentation(s) or 
omission(s).  
In Blue Chip Stamps, et al. v. Manor Drug Stores,26 the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld the rule in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel, Inc.,27 interpreting the “in connection 
with” requirement to exclude three classes of putative 10(b) plaintiffs, holders 
26
 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
27 193 F. 2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
9constituting the second of these.28  At its core, the Birnbaum rule prohibited claims by
those classes of plaintiffs who did not actively participate in the market in response to a 
defendant’s alleged fraud.29  Non-purchasers or non-sellers would necessarily be bringing
suit based largely on oral versions of events that would be difficult to prove or disprove,30
and which would inevitably get to trial, thereby increasing the potential for strike suits 
and the discovery abuses and extortionate settlements with which they are associated.31
Since Blue Chip, the Second Circuit has made it clear that “the requirement of 
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security is not satisfied by an allegation 
that plaintiffs were induced fraudulently not to sell their securities.”32
Many allegedly damaged investors claim to have bought stocks based on tainted 
research.  But others, who also claim to have been damaged by the same alleged market 
manipulation, did not buy or sell shares in response to the analysts’ biased research 
reports and recommendations, but simply held their stocks in reliance on analysts’ 
continued rosy valuations, target prices, and recommendations.  This latter group, the so-
28
 Speaking of the classes of plaintiffs barred by the Birnbaum rule, the Court said “[s]econd are actual 
shareholders in the issuer who allege that they decided not to sell their shares because of an unduly rosy 
representation or a failure to disclose unfavorable material.”  Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 737-38.  
29
 According to the Court, “In the absence of the Birnbaum doctrine, bystanders to the securities marketing 
process could await developments on the sidelines without risk, claiming that inaccuracies in disclosure 
caused nonselling in a falling market and that unduly pessimistic predictions by the issuer followed by a 
rising market caused them to allow retrospectively golden opportunities to pass.”  Id. at 747.
30
 The difficulty of proving what “one would have done” might involve some of the following conjecture or 
speculation:  would plaintiff have actually sold the shares, how many shares would she have sold, when
would she have sold them, and might she have used the proceeds of sale to purchase – in that market –
something that turned out to be even more worthless?  See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 758 n.2 (Powell, J. 
concurring).
31 Id. at 739-413.  See also Boone & McGowan, Standing to Sue under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 TEX. L. REV. 
617, 648-649 (1971)(arguing against expansion of litigation under 10b by those not purchasers or sellers).  
Congress has expressed elimination of vexatious “blackmail” or “strike” suits to be a goal of its securities 
legislation.  Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 740-41; see also Securities Litigation, 1994: Hearings on H.R. 417 
Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 
118 (1994) (testimony of Donald C. Langevoort, Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt 
Univ. School of Law)(arguing that procedural amendments contained in the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 would help eliminate strike suits). 
32 Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original), citing Blue Chip 
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737-38.
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called “holders,” cannot allege that any fraud committed against them was “in connection 
with a purchase or sale of securities” as required by 10b.33  Their cases, thus, have been 
remanded to state court.  The Second and Ninth Circuits have ruled that such district 
court rulings are not appealable.34
The “holder” class action claimants in analyst bias cases are not left without a 
remedy, however.  Given that their suits cannot be brought under the federal statutory 
securities fraud scheme, they may proceed in state court35 even though ordinarily they 
would be barred from doing so by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act.36
State causes of action, assuming they are not time barred, might include such things as
breach of contract,37 breach of fiduciary duty,38 breach of state unfair business practices39
33 See, e.g., Lowe v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 206 F.Supp.2d 442 (W.D.N.Y. 2002); Korsinsky v. 
Salomon Smith Barney Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6085 (SWK), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 259 (S.D.N.Y. January 9, 
2002); McCullagh v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 01 Civ. 7322 (DAB) 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3758 
(S.D.N.Y. March 5, 2002).
34 Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2003); United Investors 
Life Insurance Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2004); Abada v. Charles Schwab & 
Co., 300 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2002).  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently disagreed.  Kircher v. 
Putnam Funds Trust, No. 04-1495, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 13345 (7th Cir. June 29, 2004).
35
 In denying relief to nonpurchasers of securities, the Supreme Court noted that the harsh result for those 
unable to prove purchaser/seller status, including holders, was mitigated “to the extent that remedies are 
available to nonpurchasers and nonsellers under state law.”  421 U.S. at 739 n.9.  A number of federal cases 
have recognized this outcome.  See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 147 F. Supp. 2d 584 
(W.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that covered class actions alleging misrepresentations in connection with mere 
“holding” of a covered security are not removable to federal court under SLUSA); Gordon v. Buntrock, No. 
00 Civ. 303, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5977 at *9-10 (N.D. Ill. April 28, 2000) (remanding a state law claim 
despite SLUSA because the complaint explicitly limited the class to all persons holding shares before any 
of the alleged misrepresentations took place).
36
 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p and 78bb(f)).  SLUSA 
provides that “no covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of any State or subdivision 
thereof may be maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party alleging ... an untrue statement 
or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security ....” 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77p(b), 77bb(f).  This law was enacted in 1998 to close a loophole in the PSLRA whereby “many class 
action plaintiffs avoided the stringent procedural hurdles erected by PSLRA by bringing suit in state rather 
than federal court.” Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 107-108 (2d Cir. 2001). 
37 See, e.g., Dacey v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 263 F. Supp. 2d 706 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)(alleging breach of 
contract based on violation of various professional standards).
38 See, e.g., Korsinsky v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6085 (SWK), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
259 (S.D.N.Y. January 9, 2002)(alleging breach of fiduciary duty under New York common law).
39 See, e.g., Feitelberg v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (N.D. Cal.) aff’d 353 F.3d 765 
(9th Cir. 2003) (alleging that defendants engaged in unfair business practices in violation of California 
11
or consumer fraud statutes,40 or even more general tort claims.41  The merits of any such 
claims are beyond the scope of this Article.
Another question raised by the “in connection with” requirement is whether more 
tangential cases against analysts qualify.42  A case in point is the WorldCom-related suit
In re TARGETS Sec. Litig.43  The plaintiffs in that case purchased so-called “Targeted 
Growth Enhanced Terms Securities With Respect to the Common Stock of MCI 
WorldCom, Inc., (‘TARGETS’)” derivative securities whose price was linked to 
WorldCom’s.  They alleged claims under 10(b), inter alia, against Salomon Smith Barney 
and its star telecommunications analyst, Jack Grubman, based on allegedly tainted 
research and recommendations regarding WorldCom.44  Construing 10(b) “broadly and 
flexibly,”45 District Judge Denise Cote of the Southern District of New York found the 
plaintiffs’ claims to satisfy the requirement:
Business and Professions Code § 17200); Feitelberg v. Credit Suisse FirstBoston LLC, No. C-03-3451 SC, 
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19116 (N.D. Cal. October 21, 2003) (same).
40 See, e.g., Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., No. 3:02cv2014, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20918 
(M.D. Pa. November 20, 2003)(alleging, inter alia, unjust enrichment and violation of Pennsylvania 
Deceptive Practices Act).  The court in Rowinski dismissed plaintiffs’ state law-based claims without 
prejudice.  Id. at *13 n. 6 (noting that plaintiffs “may be able to assert claims under federal securities 
laws”).
41 See, e.g., Susan Salisbury, Delray Retiree Sues Over $2 Million in Stock Losses, PALM BEACH (FLA.) 
POST (August 15, 2003), at 1D (reporting on suit based on Florida tort of “outrage” brought against 
Salomon Smith Barney for allegedly repeatedly recommending plaintiff hold bad stocks, seeking only 
damages for mental pain and suffering caused by plaintiff’s losses on Worldcom stock).  
42
 Other equally “tangential” cases are outside the scope of this Article, including those federal class
actions that purport to state claims under other than 10(b), but also arising out of tainted research 
allegations.  See, e.g., Norman v. Salomon Smith Barney, 03 Civ. 4391 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10619 (S.D.N.Y., June 8, 2004) (setting forth claims under Investment Advisors Act).
43 Nos. 02 Civ. 3288 and 03 Civ. 9490 (DLC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11696 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2004).
44
 Cf.  In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing allegations 
against WorldCom, its officers, directors, outside auditors and underwriters, as well as against Salomon 
Smith Barney and Grubman based on their tainted research reports, which failed to disclose an illegal “quid 
pro quo” relationship between SSB and Grubman on the one hand and WorldCom and its some of its 
officers on the other.  Id. at 404-406.
45 In re Ames Dep't Stores Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 964-65 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the “in 
connection with” requirement should be construed broadly and flexibly to allow the securities fraud statute 
to capture novel frauds as well as more commonplace ones.)
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The Complaint alleges a direct link between the value of the TARGETS securities 
and the alleged misrepresentations and omissions regarding WorldCom, and 
alleges that the plaintiffs bought TARGETS in reliance on the misrepresentations 
and omissions about WorldCom.  There could be no serious argument that 
statements which are admittedly “in connection with” the purchase and sale of 
WorldCom stock were not also statements “in connection with” the trading in 
WorldCom options. Given the linkage between the value at redemption of 
TARGETS and the WorldCom stock price, it requires a very small extension of 
this principle to find that the plaintiffs have alleged a fraud in connection with the 
purchase and sale of TARGETS.46
Thus the “in connection with” element has proven to be a stumbling block really 
only for would be plaintiffs who were holders.  For those suits that do surmount the “in 
connection with” hurdle, the first order of business is to allege and prove a 
misrepresentation or omission of fact.  This basic element of a securities fraud case is 
discussed in the following section.
Section II – False Statements and Omissions
(a) Misrepresentations and Omissions Generally
In the right circumstances, either a misrepresentation and/or an omission can 
create 10(b) liability.  As is true in any run of the mill fraud case, a misrepresentation is 
an assertion that is not in accord with the truth.47  Unlike many investor class actions, the 
46
 In re TARGETS Sec. Litig., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11696, at **28-29.
47 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862-863 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting that the false or 
misleading nature of a statement must be considered “in light of the facts existing at the time” of the 
statement, in search of the statement’s  “relationship to the truth”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 159.  Outside the analyst liability context, though seemingly equally applicable to the analyst 
bias setting, the Second Circuit has stated that the misstatement violating 10(b) must relate to facts that 
“‘affect the probable future of the company and [that] may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell or hold 
13
analyst bias cases tend not to involve allegations of misrepresented facts about the issuing 
companies, these types of claims usually being alleged against issuers themselves.  
Instead, the analyst bias cases typically allege that by issuing overly optimistic research 
reports and recommendations, analysts were publishing disingenuous opinions – the 
functional equivalent of falsehoods.
Alternatively, or in tandem, the suits tend to allege that the ratings and 
recommendations issued by analysts were misleading by omission.  Omissions are
actionable where defendants “omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading.”48  In the analyst bias cases, analysts’ research reports and other 
recommendations may have omitted the fact of their ownership interests in stocks 
researched, or they may have failed to disclose their firm’s investment banking 
relationship or desired relationship with the subject issuer, or the fact that an analyst’s 
compensation may have been tied to attraction or retention of that investment banking 
business from issuers the analyst covered.  
Whether liability attaches to analysts’ subjective, predictive-type statements and 
whether omissions of the sort identified rendered the statements analysts did make 
misleading ones is an interesting question. What follows is a more specific discussion of 
the law of misrepresentations and omissions as it relates to analyst bias cases. 
(b) Disingenuous Opinions as Misrepresentations
From an objective standpoint, analysts’ ratings and recommendations are perhaps 
more like opinions and/or predictions rather than hard facts upon which investors are 
the company’s securities.’” Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 179 (2d Cir. 2001) 
quoting Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849.
48
 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5(b).
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entitled to rely.  Facts can generally be proven to be either true or false as of the time of 
their making.49  Predictions cannot, but this does not mean they are inoculated from 
liability.  It has long been held that predictions and forward-looking statements can be 
considered “facts” in the context of 10(b)’s fraud proscription.50 If a prediction has no 
basis, or the maker of the prediction doubts its validity given other facts in his or her 
possession, liability will attach.51  Similarly, even assuming optimistic research reports 
and attendant recommendations are viewed as opinions, the U.S. Supreme Court has held 
that there can be 10(b) liability for issuers’ statements of opinion when it can be shown 
either that the speaker intentionally misrepresented his actual opinion or that the opinion 
lacked any underlying justification.52
This rationale explains, in part, the basis for several pre-bubble suits against 
analysts and broker-dealers based on their public stock recommendations.  For example, 
the Southern District of New York refused to dismiss a 10(b) class action captioned In re
Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. Sec. Litig.53  The suit was based on so-called “Trading 
Notes” CSFB had disseminated to investors in the form of a purported analyst’s research 
report containing a “sell” recommendation.  In reality, the Trading Notes had been 
49 Cf. Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 805 (11th Cir. 1999) (defining forward-looking statements for 
purposes of the PSLRA’s safe harbor provisions as those that are not presently verifiable).
50 See, e.g., Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that “it is . . . well-settled that 
Rule 10b-5 applies to predictive statements” and that “when necessary, courts have readily conceded that 
predictions may be regarded as ‘facts’ within the meaning of the antifraud provisions of the securities 
laws”); Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that if a 
company chooses to make predictions, “its disclosure must be full and fair” and stating that projections “are 
considered ‘statements of fact’ for purposes of the securities laws”).
51 See, e.g., Rubinstein, 20 F.3d at 166 (finding that a predictive statement incorporates factual assertions, 
inter alia, that the statement has a reasonable basis and that the maker is unaware of any undisclosed facts 
that seriously undermine its validity); Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(predictions can be actionable where defendants have knowledge of facts that must have caused them to 
question their predictions).
52
 Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1093, 1095-96 (1991); San Leandro Emergency 
Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 812-13 & n.13 (2d Cir. 1996); In re 
Apple Computer Secs. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1989).
53
 No. 97 CV 4760 (JGK), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16560 (October 19, 1998 SDNY 1998)
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prepared by the firm’s proprietary trading group and an analyst’s name affixed thereto 
without disclosure therein that CSFB held short positions in the two stocks that were 
portrayed negatively in the Notes.  When it became public that the firm had profited from 
its short positions in the two issuers for which the negative ratings were published, the 
firm issued revised Notes and ultimately admitted that the Notes had been prepared 
outside its standard operating procedure and should not have been disseminated as they 
were.54
CSFB raised as a defense that the stock recommendations contained in the 
Trading Notes were merely non-actionable opinions.55  In that regard, the court ruled that 
“statements of opinion are actionable under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if they are made in 
bad faith or are not reasonably supported by evidence available to the person or entity 
that issues the statements.”56
The Ninth Circuit had previously reached the same conclusion in another case 
involving analysts’ stock recommendations.  In Cooper v. Pickett,57 a more dated suit, 
Lehman Brothers and Robinson-Humphrey were sued by investors for optimistic 
statements made by their analysts.  In the context of reversing dismissal of the suit at the 
pleading stage, the Ninth Circuit made it clear that analyst’s reports containing opinions 
can be actionable where they are “not genuinely and reasonably believed, or if the 
54 Id. at **3-7.
55
 Perhaps a more compelling argument was made that the opinions were immaterial.  See notes *-* infra. 
[discussion of CSFB in materiality section]
56 Id. at *14, quoting Kurzweil v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., Nos. 94 Civ. 2373, 94 Civ. 2456, 1997 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4451, *26 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1997), and further referring the reader to Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 
1059, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1985), for the proposition that “predictions can be actionable where the defendants' 
knowledge of various facts must have caused them to have reservations about the predictions.”  Id.
57 137 F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 1996).
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speaker is aware of undisclosed facts that tend seriously to undermine the statement’s 
accuracy.”58
Though scant, this precedent is directly on point, squarely answering in the 
negative the question whether analysts are protected merely by virtue of the fact their 
statements are mere “targets” (predictions) or “our judgment as of this date” (opinions).  
Given the variety of fact patterns involved in the cases that have been considered so far, 
though, their results have been less than uniform.  
Proving an opinion to be disingenuous is not easy, as rarely is there direct 
evidence of the defendant’s true thoughts.  Therefore in analyst bias cases, plaintiffs 
seeking to base their 10(b) claims on false opinions are typically relying on 
circumstantial facts and allegations purporting to show inconsistency between what the 
analyst said and what he or she did.
For example in DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens, Inc.,59 plaintiffs alleged that the 
analyst privately recommended his firm sell its shares just a week after his report’s Buy 
recommendation and three days before he issued another rosy report with a Buy 
recommendation.  The analyst and his employer-broker sold the bulk of their shares 
immediately after the analyst’s secret “sell” recommendation was made internally.60
These specific factual allegations, according to the court, were enough to permit a 
reasonable factfinder to infer that the “buy” recommendation contained in the defendants’ 
58 Id. at 629, citing In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989).
59
 No. 03 Civ. 590 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 265 (S.D.N.Y. January 8, 2004).
60 Id. at **13-14.  
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publicly available reports was not just bad advice but was a false statement of opinion, in 
that the defendant’s real opinion was that (preferred) investors should sell.61
Not all plaintiffs have access to such persuasive inside information in making 
their cases.  In a related suit involving the same defendants and district court judge, 
plaintiffs in Podany v. Robertson Stephens, Inc.,62 were unable to overcome the falsity 
hurdle.63  There, the defendant analyst was alleged to have issued false opinions 
regarding a proposed merger so as to “pump” the price of a stock he owned and on which 
he would stand to gain dearly if the merger upon which he reported and opined was 
consummated.  However, there was no evidence and therefore no allegation that he 
“dumped” his stock inconsistently with his opinions.64  In support of their false opinion 
argument, Plaintiffs maintained that the analyst had no reasonable basis for his opinion, 
that his ownership interest in the subject company was not disclosed, and that he had 
engaged in other similar frauds with other stocks.65  The court found none of these 
claimed facts independently or in the aggregate was sufficient to adequately allege the 
necessary false or misleading statement in support of a 10(b) claim.66  This ruling seems 
to have melded the misrepresentation element with the scienter element.  If the analyst’s 
opinion lacked a reasonable basis, he had failed to disclose a material conflict of interest, 
and he had acted in a similarly fraudulent way with other stocks, it appears that his 
61 Id. at **14-15.  See also Judge Lynch’s description of his ruling and rationale in the DeMarco case, in 
Podany v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2290  **20-21 (S.D.N.Y. February 10, 2004).
62
 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2290, (S.D.N.Y. February 10, 2004).
63 See also Ward v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., No. Civ. No. 02-3878 (JAP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24056
(D.N.J. September 10, 2003).  Ward filed a class action suit under 10(b) based on analyst Walter Piecyk, 
Jr.’s notorious $1000 target price for Qualcomm stock.  However, the court found that the complaint 
contained no allegations supportive of the notion that Piecyk’s forward-looking statement was “not 
‘genuinely and reasonably believed’ when made” citing In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 
357, 368 (3d Cir. 1993).
64 Id. at **5-13, *21 n.3
65 Id. at *22.
66 Id. at **32-34.
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statement was at least misleading.  Whether he had intent to defraud (as evidenced 
perhaps by motive and opportunity, such as profiting from his conduct in falsely inflating 
a stock’s price) is more a question of scienter.67
Unlike the circumstantial cases, some of the analyst bias complaints have been 
boosted by the publication of results of various administrative and governmental 
investigations into the analyst bias scandal.  Several state attorneys general and the 
Securities Exchange Commission have released evidence in the form of email messages 
to and from analysts, many of which revealed that analysts did not believe in the very 
stocks they were touting, or that they gave higher ratings than they otherwise would have 
due to the pressures created by the investment banking conflict of interest.68  In these 
cases, plaintiffs can fairly easily allege a prima facie case regarding the falsity of the 
analysts’ opinions, assuming the contrary opinions or conflicts of interest discussed in the 
emails relate to the stock of which plaintiffs complain.   
A case in point is DeMarco v. Lehman Brothers Inc.,69 in which the plaintiff was 
able to take advantage of emails published by the SEC revealing in the analyst’s own 
words that he did not legitimately hold the opinions he was pushing publicly.70  The 
emails in the Lehman case took the form of a sell recommendation communicated 
privately to a preferred customer, an institutional investor, when in fact the analyst’s 
67
 See infra Section *.
68 See, e.g., Susanne Craig, Wall Street Stock Research at a Crossroads --- Betting on Overhaul, One 
Analyst Weighs Getting Back in Game, WALL ST. J. (November 8, 2002) Section C, page 1 (describing 
CSFB e-mails discovered by Massachussetts Attorney General’s investigation);  Gretchen Morgenson, 
Regulators Find More Red Flags in Another Analyst’s Optimism, N. Y. TIMES (September 12, 2002), 
Section C, page 1 (describing Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette e-mail messages uncovered in SEC’s 
investigation into stock analysts’ conflict of interest); Patrick McGeehan, Merrill Lynch Under Attack as 
Giving Out Tainted Advice, N. Y. TIMES (April 9, 2002), Section C, page 1 (describing e-mails revealed by 
New York Attorney General’s investigation into Merrill Lynch).
69
 No. 03 Civ. 3470 (JSR), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5026 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
70 Id. at *3.
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reports recommended “buy” to all other readers.71  Similar so-called bad email cases 
include those in which the analysts’ internal email discussions with co-workers revealed 
their truly held opinions were contrary to those set out in their publicly disseminated 
reports.72  The misrepresentation element is easily met in these cases, given the proof of 
false opinions. 
But bad email allegations alone may not be enough where there is no direct 
connection between the stock plaintiffs bought and the specifics of the available email 
evidence.  In Pfeiffer v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,73 plaintiffs’ amended complaint referred 
to analysts’ e-mail messages that had been discovered during an investigation by the 
Massachusetts Securities Division.74  However, the emails to which plaintiffs referred did 
not discuss the stock that allegedly resulted in damage to plaintiffs.75  Instead, plaintiffs 
used the emails as part of an effort to show that the defendants’ investment banking 
divisions had unreasonable influence over their analysts, thereby presumably tainting all 
of their research and recommendations.76  This, the court did not condone, ruling that 
where there were no allegations tending to prove that defendants did not actually hold 
their stated opinions or that their investment banking divisions improperly influenced the 
reports targeted by plaintiffs, the complaint lacked any specific allegations that the 
ratings were “false,” failing the particularity requirement of the PSLRA.77  The suit was 
71 Id. at *3, **6-7.  A brief email exchange between the analyst and the customer discussing the 
worthlessness of the stock concluded with the analyst stating, “we bank these guys so I always have to cut 
the benefit of the doubt.”  Id.
72
 #Blodget-M/L cases? Others?
73
 No. 02Civ. 2912 (HB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11120 (June 30, 2003)
74 Id. at *7-8.
75 Id. at *8.
76 Id. at *16-17.
77 Id. at *17.  In so ruling, the court referred to the “inherent subjectivity” of stock recommendations, 
and the “market’s seemingly boundless infatuation with internet technology stocks at that time” as 
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dismissed with prejudice,78 and that result affirmed without comment by the Second 
Circuit in an unpublished opinion. 79
On the other hand, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Southern District has opined in a 
case with no email evidence that basic allegations of bias can suffice to support a finding 
that the analysts’ opinions were misleading, because to hold otherwise would confound 
the elements of misrepresentation and scienter.80 According to Judge Scheindlin, to 
satisfy 10(b), a statement must be objectively false (misrepresentation element), and also 
subjectively false, from both the defendant’s perspective (the scienter element) and the 
plaintiff’s perspective (the reliance element).81 Judge Scheindlin, thus correctly reads
Second Circuit precedent82 and the Supreme Court’s Virginia Bankshares Inc. v. 
Sandberg83 as making an opinion actionable only where (1) it is not believed by the 
speaker (subjectively false) and it is (2) objectively false.84 In her view, the former is the 
scienter inquiry and the latter’s proper focus is whether the plaintiff has pleaded the 
preventing the court from buying the plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations about falsity of the analysts’ 
opinions.  Id.
78 Id. at *20.  Senior District Judge Pollack’s dismissal of several of the Merrill Lynch cases is based, in 
part, on very similar grounds.  In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig, (re 24/7 Real 
Media and Interliant), 273 F. Supp.2d 351, 370-371, 374-375 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (no email evidence 
implicates stocks at issue in that case); In re Merrill Lynch Tyco Research Sec. Litig., No. 03 CV 4080 
(MP), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2247, *12-14 (S.D.N.Y., February 18, 2004) (holding that  plaintiffs failed to 
plead with sufficient particularity their allegation that the analysts recommendations “lacked any 
reasonable basis”).  The former of these is discussed at more length in Section VI, infra, regarding loss 
causation.
79
 Weinstein v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 93 Fed. Appx. 326 (2d. Cir. 2004).
80
 Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros., 03 Civ. 5194 (SAS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9193, *53-55 (S.D.N.Y. May 
21, 2004).
81 Id. at *51.
82 See, e.g., In re Time Warner Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 1993); Goldman v. Belden, 1068-1069 
(2d Cir. 1985); In re AOLTime Warner Sec. and “ERISA” Litig., No. 02 Civ. 5575 (SWK), 2004 U.S. Dist 
LEXIS 7917 (SDNY, May 5, 2004). 
83 501 U.S. 1083 (1991) (holding that knowingly false statements of reasons, opinions, or beliefs contained 
in proxy solicitation are not per se inactionable under 14(a) of the 1934 Act).
84 Id. at 1092-1096.
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subject statements’ “misleading” nature with particularity, as required by the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act.85
In any private action … in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant (A) made 
an untrue statement of a material fact, or (B) omitted to state a material fact …, 
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, [and] 
the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading.86
This requirement goes above and beyond the general mandate of Rule 9(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requiring that alleged fraud be pled “with 
particularity,”87 and it has been read to mean that the plaintiffs must allege the “who, 
what, how, when, where” of the fraud, especially why purportedly fraudulent statements 
are false or misleading and/or how it is alleged that any misstatements or omissions 
constitute fraud.88
From Judge Scheindlin’s perspective, the following four allegations of bias 
identified in the plaintiffs’ complaint adequately apprise defendants as to why their buy 
recommendations and price targets were “objectively” misleading:89  (1) investment 
banking divisions improperly influenced research in an effort to gain lucrative investment 
banking business, (2) analysts had financial conflicts of interest regarding stocks they 
covered, (3) issuers were permitted to review analysts reports before they were issued, 
and (4) there was an unwritten rule discouraging downgrading stocks or assigning 
85 Id. at *54 n.123 (maintaining that the misleading nature of a falsehood and its deliberateness are different 
questions).
86 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).
87 See F. R. CIV. PRO. 9(b)(“the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity.”).  See generally Note, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims with Particularity Under Rule 9(b), 
97 HARV. L. REV. 1432 (1984).
88 See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc.  Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 980 (9th Cir. 1999); Novak v. Kasaks, 
216 F.3d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 2000).
89 Id. at *57.
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negative ratings to investment banking clients’ stocks, all of which were alleged to have 
caused artificial price inflation. 90 Judge Scheindlin’s ruling, thus, is the opposite of 
Judge Baer’s in Pfeiffer, and avoids the conflation of misrepresentation and scienter from 
which Judge Lynchs’ ruling in Podany suffered.
Judge Scheindlin’s reading of Virginia Bankshares is more consistent with that 
case’s tenor and with its 10(b) progeny in the Circuit Courts.91 The falseness of a
prediction, or the misleading nature of a statement or omission satisfies the required
objective falsity, while subjective falsity of the same statement or omission is a distinct
inquiry:  scienter.  Confusion does arise with regard to the narrow category of 
misrepresentations consisting of opinions, as opposed to exaggerated or false facts, 
baseless predictions, or even straight forward omissions to state facts bearing materially 
on the speakers’ statements.  In a case where an opinion is not genuinely held, its falsity 
implies both misrepresentation (falsity) and intentional deception (scienter).  But not all 
of the statements and omissions made by analysts were strictly opinions.  Some were 
more in the nature of predictive statements (target prices, for example), and outright 
omissions.  In these cases, falsity and scienter must be viewed separately.
While there is merit to Judge Scheindlin’s more narrow approach to the objective 
falsity of analysts’ statements, perhaps a simpler means to achieve the same end would
simply have been to classify the case (and she may have implicitly done so) as one
90 Id. at *55-57.  In several cases before Senior Judge Pollack, the court dismissed plaintiffs claims based in 
large part on the fact they had failed to succinctly identify the statements they claimed were misleading, 
had failed to specify the reasons the reports were misleading, and otherwise failed to plead the alleged 
misrepresentations or omissions with sufficient particularity.  See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch Research 
Reports Sec. Litig. (Tyco), No. 03 CV 4080 (MP), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2247 *13-*14 (S.D.N.Y., 
February 18, 2004); In re Merrill Lynch Research Reports Sec. Litig. (24/7 Real Media and Interliant), 273 
F. Supp. 2d. 251, 271 (S.D.N.Y.  2003).
91 See, e.g., Miller v. Asensio & Co., Inc., 364 F.3d 223, 228 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004); Grossman v. Novell, 120 
F. 3d 111, 1120 n. 6 (10th Cir. 1997); Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 930 F.2d 617, 627 (1st Cir. 1996); 
In re Donald Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 372 (3d Cir. 1993).
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involving omissions to state the four material facts set forth above, in which case the 
question of opinions may have been sidestepped altogether.  
The classification of a given case as one involving misrepresentations or 
omissions has some of the same potential for confusion as does the confounding of falsity 
and scienter when opinions are at issue.  Viewed one way, analysts’ reports  were either 
false opinions not genuinely held or they were misleading (and therefore 
misrepresentations under 10(b)) because they failed to disclose arguably material 
conflicts of interest.  On the other hand, they could be seen as omissions to state material 
facts.  The next subsection addresses the 10(b) law of omissions.
(b) Omissions
Given the nature of the “tainted” research fact patterns, and the essentially 
predictive or subjective quality of their statements, it can be difficult to label them as 
either strictly misrepresentations or omissions.  But this classification as omission or 
misrepresentations is important for a number of reasons.  First, as discussed further 
below, where omissions are involved, not only materiality, but a duty to speak must be 
proven.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, a presumption of reliance is permitted 
where material omissions are involved, while the presumption of reliance for 
misrepresented information may have to be based on the fraud-on-the-market theory, 
which is in question in this context, as discussed more fully in Section VI below.     
Overlapping with the cases complaining that defendant analysts rendered false 
opinions are those in which the allegations center on omitted facts: the investment 
banking-research conflict of interest, analysts’ tied compensation schemes, and/or analyst 
or brokerage ownership position in covered stocks, or in at least one case, an alleged 
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“quid pro quo arrangement” between the analyst/broker-dealer on one hand and an issuer 
on the other hand, for positive ratings and recommendations and inside access to hot IPO 
stocks for the issuer’s executives in exchange for lucrative investment banking and other 
business.92
There is precedent, outside the realm of analyst bias as herein defined, for the 
proposition that failure to disclose important conflicts of interest can result in liability for 
those giving stock recommendations.  Recently, allegations of an undisclosed conflict of 
interest were made in a 10(b) claim against an analyst in Cybermedia Group Inc. v. 
Island Mortgage Network, Inc.93  Courtney Smith, a financial analyst, money manager, 
and entrepreneur, who regularly appears on financial news programs,94 claimed in an 
appearance on CNN that stock in Apponline.com (“AOP”) was a “double your money” 
investment.  Plaintiffs alleged that at the time of Smith’s recommendation of AOP, he 
was negotiating with venture capital company called Inculab to act as its CEO.  As part 
of any proposed compensation package with Inculab, Smith stood to receive Inculab 
stock, which was directly tied to the value of AOP since Inculab had a significant 
investment in AOP.95  Plaintiffs also alleged that Smith’s statement on CNN caused the 
price of AOP to “surge.”96
92
 This latter is the thrust of the plaintiffs’ case against infamous telecom analyst Jack Grubman and his 
employer and broker-dealer Salomon Smith Barney (now a division of Citigroup known simply as Smith 
Barney), relating to putative artificial inflation of WorldCom stock price.  See, e.g., In re WorldCom Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392 (S.D.N.Y 2003) (referring to undisclosed relationship between analyst and 
broker dealer on one hand and issuer and its executives on the other as “illicit”).  
93 183 F.Supp.2d 559 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
94 See http://www.courtneysmithco.com, last visited 06/03/04.
95
 183 F. Supp. 2d at 567.
96 Id.
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The court denied Smith’s motion to dismiss.  He had argued his “double your 
money” statement not a misrepresentation but was immaterial puffery,97 but the court 
ruled that no complaint should be dismissed unless the utterance was “so obviously 
unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable minds could not differ on the 
question,” and reasonable minds could differ here.98  The court bolstered its ruling with 
two further comments lacking any accompanying analysis:  “Furthermore, the Amended 
Complaint states that Smith knew that the statement was false at the time it was made and 
Smith's failure to disclose his impending conflict of interest could constitute a material 
omission.”99
This latter comment exemplifies the linkage between omissions and their 
materiality.  In fact, the discussion in most cases involving omissions revolves around 
materiality, which is discussed in more depth below.
Section III – Materiality
As neither a misrepresentation nor an omission can form the basis for 10(b) 
liability unless it is material, it is common for the defense in 10(b) cases to argue 
immateriality.  Generally the materiality inquiry will take one of several forms, typically 
dependent upon whether a misrepresentation or omission has been alleged.100  If what has 
been alleged is a misrepresentation, it must be of a material fact.  Alternatively, a plaintiff 
97 The court seemed inclined to view the statement that way as well, remarking as follows: 
… it seems that it would be unreasonable for an investor to base an investment decision on one 
analyst’s assertion that a particular stock’s value would double or that such an assertion could be 
more than mere puffery or optimism, reasonable minds may differ as to whether the particular
statement is material.
Id. at 573.  
98 Id. at 573, quoting Ganino v. Citizens Util. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Goldman v. 
Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985)).  
99
 183 F. Supp. 2d at 573.
100
 It is not entirely clear that the analysis engaged in by the courts always depends on what has been pled.  
Instead, because of the interrelated and often overlapping nature of misrepresentations and omissions, the 
analysis may be driven by the court’s own perspective on what has been alleged, or the court’s reaction to 
defense framing of the arguments.
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can allege that an omission rendered the affirmative statement(s) misleading in a material 
way.  Finally, there is allegation that the defendant omitted to state a material fact.  When 
the latter is alleged, plaintiff must also plead and prove a duty to disclose the omitted 
information, which at its core devolves into an inquiry into the omitted information’s 
materiality.  
(a) The Materiality of Omitted Information Under 10(b)
In the context of an issuer’s failure to disclose merger negotiations, the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,101 expressly adopted the TSC Indus. Inc. v. 
Northway Inc.102 test for materiality of omitted information for use in 10(b) cases:  “to 
fulfill the materiality requirement ‘there must be a substantial likelihood that the 
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as 
having significantly altered the “total mix” of information made available.”103  In Basic, 
the Court found that the existence of merger negotiations could in certain circumstances 
constitute material information, but it expressly declined to opine about the application of 
its materiality test to “other kinds of contingent or speculative information, such as 
earnings forecasts or projections.”104
Even before Basic, however, the U.S. Supreme Court had had occasion to discuss 
materiality in the context of a 10(b) omission of facts in the case of Affiliated Ute Citizens 
of Utah v. U.S.105  There, a bank was employed to act as a transfer agent for Indian 
owners of stock in an Indian asset management and protection company.  Two employees 
101 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
102 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
103 485 U.S. at 231-232.
104 Id. at 232 n.9, referring the reader generally to Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts' Approach to 
Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information: Old Problems, 
Changing Views, 46 MD. L. REV. 1114 (1987).
105
 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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of the bank engaged in a scheme to develop a non-Indian market for the stock, and they 
purchased such stock from Indians for themselves and other non-Indians at depressed 
prices without disclosing their market making activities.106  The Court had no difficulty in 
finding that the omitted information was material, stating as a prelude to its now famous 
holding eliminating the need for individual reliance when an omitted statement is 
material: “The [Indian] sellers had the right to know that the defendants were in a 
position to gain financially from their sales ….”107
The Second Circuit has applied the Basic materiality test in a variety of different 
securities fraud settings.108  A slightly different formulation has been applied in the 
Second Circuit as well:  “To be material, the information need not be such that a 
reasonable investor would necessarily change his investment decision based on the 
information, as long as a reasonable investor would have viewed it as significantly 
altering the ‘total mix’ of information available.”109
It seems clear that under either version of the materiality test, and given the 
existing precedents, the analyst bias cases alleging omission of facts describing conflicts
of interest such as the investment banking influence or analyst/brokerage ownership of  
covered stocks would be deemed material.  Echoing the U.S. Supreme Court in Affiliated 
Ute, investors had a right to know of analysts’ potential motives in touting certain stocks.
(b)  Existing Precedent
106 Id. at 150.
107 Id. at 153.  See also Chasins v. Smith Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding 
broker’s nondisclosure of fact it was market-maker for recommended security to be material).
108 See, e.g., ###; Securities and Exchange Comm’n v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1467-68 (2d 
Cir. 1996)(finding material a broker’s failure to disclose its markups on stocks being sold, such that the 
price was not being set by the open market).
109
 SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 1997), citing TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449, 
(1976).  
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In CSFB Sec. Litig., another defense raised was that any omission in its Trading 
Notes was immaterial.  The court held that the plaintiffs had adequately pled facts 
sufficient to resist a motion to dismiss, stating:  “… a reasonable trier of fact could 
conclude that the failure to disclose CSFBC's short positions was a failure to disclose 
material facts necessary to make the projections not misleading.”110  Further in its 
defense, the firm argued that its failure to disclose its interest in the two stocks it 
recommended investors sell could not be actionable absent a duty to disclose, citing 
Chiarella v. United States.111  The court made quick work of this argument, noting that 
while there may be instances in which one has no duty to speak, when one chooses to 
speak, one must make full and fair disclosure.  For the court, this argument actually 
collapsed back into a question of materiality:  “Moreover, the failure to disclose that 
market prices are being artificially depressed operates as a deceit on the marketplace and 
is an omission of a material fact.”112
Relatively uncomplicated and succinct, the CSFB opinion stands for the simple 
proposition that a biased research analyst recommendation is misleading in a material 
way, whether it is classified specifically as a misrepresentation or an omission.  
Bolstering this conclusion are a number of published opinions in cases that have 
been permitted to proceed against other persons recommending stocks as well as against 
investment advisors, or retail “stock brokers” – those with direct contact with the 
investors who purchase from broker dealers – based on allegations of false investment 
110 Id. at *15.
111 445 U.S. 222 (1980).  It is noteworthy for purposes of this discussion that Chiarella was an insider 
trading case brought under SEC Rules 10b-5(a) and (c), prohibiting the use of “any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud” and “any act, practice, or course of business” that would operate as such, as opposed to 
10b-5(b), which expressly proscribes untrue statements of material fact and/or omissions that render the 
facts asserted misleading.  Id. at 225 n.5.
112
 In re CSFB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16560 at *17.
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advice or undisclosed conflicts of interest.  Some of these cases involve the practice of an 
investment advisor trading on the effect of his recommendation, which is known as 
“scalping.”113  Though not always precisely on point in part because they are typically 
brought under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 (as opposed to 10(b)),114 these cases 
can shed some light on various elements of a 10(b) claim.  In many instances, the facts 
that have been alleged against non-analyst defendants parallel those being asserted today 
in the analyst bias cases.  At a minimum they are quite analogous.
Like CSFB,115 the non-analyst cases generally have found to be material the fact 
an investment advisor or other person giving investment advice has a stake in the security 
or its issuer, or that he otherwise stood to gain from the sale in an undisclosed manner.  
The governing principle in this area, emanating from the U. S. Supreme Court in a non-
10(b) case, is that an investor has a right to know this type of information so as to fully 
consider the motivations of the one making the stock recommendation:
An adviser who, like respondents, secretly trades on the market effect of his own 
recommendation may be motivated -- consciously or unconsciously -- to 
recommend a given security not because of its potential for long-run price 
increase (which would profit the client), but because of its potential for short-run 
price increase in response to anticipated activity from the recommendation (which 
would profit the adviser).  An investor seeking the advice of a registered 
investment adviser must, if the legislative purpose is to be served, be permitted to 
113 See Gross, supra note * at 637.
114 Cf. Zweig v. Hearst, 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979), a case against journalist who recommended stocks in 
his column, and not arising from Investment Advisor’s Act, but instead under 10(b).  Id. at 1267.
115
 See text accompanying notes *-*.  The court in that case said “a reasonable investor would have 
discounted the projections in the report if the investor had been aware of CSFBC’s self-interest.”  Credit 
Suisse, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16560, at *19-20.
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evaluate such overlapping motivations, through appropriate disclosure, in 
deciding whether an adviser is serving “two masters” or only one, “especially . . . 
if one of the masters happens to be economic self-interest.”116
This is true even if the investor might not have changed his investment decision as a 
result.117
Several circuit court cases against non-analysts have borne this rationale out.  For 
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered materiality of omitted 
information in the 10(b) context in Zweig v. Hearst.118  The defendant in the case was a 
journalist who recommended stocks of small regional companies in his columns.  What 
he did not tell readers, though, was that he typically purchased shares in the issuer before 
writing it up, such that he stood to gain if the column induced increased sales and pushed 
the price of these otherwise thinly traded stocks up.119  Buying the plaintiffs’ argument 
that 10(b) required disclosure so that investors could for themselves analyze the 
columnist’s objectivity, the court found that the omitted information was material.120  The 
court’s rationale was particularly compelling:
Had [defendant columnist’s] story objectively reported an undisputed fact or news 
event, such as the discovery of a valuable mineral deposit or the declaration of a 
dividend, his ownership of [the stock he touted] might not have been significant in 
reasonable investors' minds. But given the column's style and tone, with its 
116
 Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 196 (note omitted).  The finding of materiality of the omitted information was 
a predicate to the Court’s ruling in the case that such an omission operated as a “fraud or deceit” within the 
context of Section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act.  15 U.S.C. §80b-6(2).
117
 SEC v. Mayhew, (2d Cir) citing  TSC Indus. v. Northway.  
118 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
119 Id. at 1264.
120 Id. at 1266.  In the court’s view, the journalist defendant’s activities were sufficiently similar to those of 
the bank employees’ in Affiliated Ute to impose upon him a duty to disclose this material information.  Id. 
at 1268.
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glowing praise of [the stock] and conclusion that the firm was a worthy 
investment despite its risks, the effect of [the journalist’s] stock ownership on his 
objectivity would be important to his readers. We conclude, therefore, that the 
omitted facts alleged as violations were material.121
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit in SEC v. Blavin122 held that an investment advisor’s 
ownership of 25%, 10% and 10% respectively, of companies he recommended in a 
monthly newsletter was material as a matter of law, stating that “the effect of such large 
holdings on Blavin’s objectivity in making investment recommendations would be 
particularly important to his clients.”123
While not involving analysts per se, these cases involved defendants who 
provided much the same service and who may have had many of the same motivations as 
today’s analyst bias defendants.  As such, they serve as strong authority for the 
proposition that a failure to disclose financial motivations associated with stock 
recommendations is a material omission under 10(b).
(c) Duty to Disclose 
Related to the materiality of omissions is the question of the speaker’s duty to 
disclose any omitted information.  On that point, the Second Circuit has held that one 
who recommends stocks must disclose facts that might indicate an adverse interest or 
even just “overlapping” motivations for the recommendation.  In Chasins v. Smith 
Barney,124 the broker-dealer failed to disclose it was a market maker in the securities it 
recommended to the plaintiff.  Even though proof at trial tended to indicate that the 
121 Id. at 1266.
122 760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1985)
123 Id. at 711.
124
 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1967).
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plaintiffs may have gotten better prices than they would otherwise have obtained in their 
over-the-counter stock purchases, the court found that the omitted information was 
material and therefore its disclosure required under 10(b). Using a rationale that appears 
to be equally forceful in the analyst bias cases, the Chasins court stated:
Here, Smith, Barney’s strong recommendations of the three securities 
Chasins purchased could have been motivated by its own market position rather 
than the intrinsic desirability of the securities for Chasins. An investor who is at 
least informed of the possibility of such adverse interests, due to his broker's 
market making in the securities recommended, can question the reasons for the 
recommendations. The investor, such as Chasins, must be permitted to evaluate 
overlapping motivations through appropriate disclosures, especially where one 
motivation is economic self-interest.125
A number of other courts have followed Chasins in holding that an undisclosed financial 
interest is material and must be disclosed by one making stock recommendations.126
(d) The Pending Analyst Bias Cases
Specifically in the analyst bias cases, the materiality discussion tends to take two 
different forms.  The first defense argument in this context is that any allegedly omi tted 
125 Id. at 1172.
126See, e.g., Addeo v. Braver, 956 F. Supp. 443, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting argument that potential 
conflict of interest created by undisclosed commissions was immaterial, as a matter of law, even though the 
amount thereof was small); SEC v. Hasho, 784 F. Supp. 1059, 1109-1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)(finding that 
“failure to disclose such commissions deprives the customer of the knowledge that his registered
representative might be recommending a security based upon the registered representative’s own financial 
interest rather than the investment value of the recommended security.”); Shivangi v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 313, 318 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (holding that “the extra compensation received by 
[salespeople] in principal trades in which [broker dealer] makes a market, over and above the compensation 
normally received in agency trades, creates a potential conflict of interest which is a material fact which 
ought by law to be disclosed to investors”); Barthe v. Rizzo, 384 F. Supp. 1063, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(holding, as regards materiality, that “[customer] was entitled to know that [salesperson] was in a position 
to gain financially” from the stock recommendation). See also Grandon v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 147 F.3d 
183, 193 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that broker dealer violates 10(b) by failing to disclose excessive markups 
in sales of municipal bonds).  
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information was immaterial and therefore need not have been disclosed.  The second is 
the contention that the omitted information was adequately disclosed contemporaneously 
with the analysts’ recommendations, or otherwise available to plaintiffs, or that sufficient 
cautionary language was provided in their reports so as to render the misstatements or 
omissions immaterial as a matter of law.  
(1) Disclosure Not Required
Perhaps given the amplitude of the authority for the proposition that the omitted 
conflicts of interest were material and therefore there was a duty to disclose them, 
defendants in the pending analyst bias case have not been particularly successful in 
arguing to the contrary.127  Generic arguments to this effect have been met with a very 
stock judicial response,128 or a finding that the disclosures defendants did make were not 
nearly specific enough.129
In an argument related to duty to disclose generally, the Worldcom defendants
argued that they were in compliance with all relevant NASD and NYSE rules130 by 
making the following disclosures or similar in their published research reports:131
127
 The exception here is the Merrill Lynch Fund cases pending before Judge Pollack.  These cases were 
asserted by mutual fund owners alleging some of the same factual predicates, but brought under Sections 
11 and 12 of the 1933 Act.  In that context, inter alia, Judge Pollack found there to be no duty to disclose 
the conflicts of interest alleged.  See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch Research Reports Sec. Litig. (Internet 
Strategies Fund), 289 F. Supp. 2d 429, 434 (2003). 
128 See infra notes * [apx 133-137] and accompanying text.
129 See also In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 97 Civ. 4760 (JGK), 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16560 at *21-22 (S.D.N.Y.  October 19, 1998) (holding that a party may not rely on a general 
disclaimer when he knows of specific adverse information that is not disclosed).
130
 Defendants cited to subsections (a) and (b) of Conduct Rule 2100(d)(2)(B)(i) of the 2000 NASD Manual 
(the NYSE’s rules are parallel), which require research reports to disclose market making activities, the fact 
that the broker dealer may engage in sales with clients as a principal, and any potential ownership interest 
in the stock researched.   A related argument was unsuccessfully made by defendants in Newton v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,, 135 F.3d 266, 274 (3rd Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding that employment of 
an industry standard practice could still be fraudulent behavior violative of 10(b),unanimously reversing 
district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants).
131
 294 F.Supp. 2d 392, 430.  
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Within the past three years, Salomon Smith Barney, including its parent, 
subsidiaries and/or affiliates, has acted as manager or co-manager of a public 
offering of the securities of this company. . . .
Salomon Smith Barney, including its parent, subsidiaries and/or affiliates ("the 
Firm"), may from time to time perform investment banking or other services for, 
or solicit investment banking or other business from, any company mentioned in 
this report . . . . The Firm, or any individuals preparing this report, may at any 
time have a position in any securities or options of any of the issuers in this 
report. An employee of the Firm may be a director of a company mentioned in 
this report.132
The court made swift work of this argument, finding that these boilerplate 
disclosures were not enough to apprise the public of the specific conflicts of interest 
omitted by defendants.133  Moreover, the court pointed to the more general NASD and 
NYSE rule requiring analysts and broker-dealers to deal fairly and in good faith and to 
avoid omitting any “material fact or qualification” which “in the light of the context of 
the material presented, would cause the communication to be misleading.” 134  This folds 
any regulatory inquiry back into a 10(b) analysis, which is appropriate for the court and 
not preempted by SEC rules mandating certain disclosures.135
132 Id.  
133 Id. See also La Grasta v. First Union National Bank, 358 F.3d 840 (11th Cir. 2004).  There the court 
ruled that such boilerplate did not put plaintiffs on notice for purposes of the statute of limitations, and 
intimating in dicta that instead, the cautionary language suggests that “that the report reflected [the 
analyst’s] unbiased judgment of the value of the stock based on her research,” perhaps in fact supporting an 
argument that the recommendations and ratings were misleading statements.  Id. at 850-581
134
 Conduct Rule 2210(d)(1)(A), NASD Manual (2000).  In fact, there were arguably a number of other 
professional standards and industry rules that prohibited this sort of conduct on the part of analysts and 
their employers.  See Olazábal and Robinson, supra note *.
135
 294 F. Supp. 2d at 430-431, citing Press v. Quick & Reilly, Inc., 218 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2000).
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The best the defense has mustered in the pending cases is argumentation based on 
the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, though generally unsuccessfully, discussed next.
(2)  Immateriality D ue to Accompanying Cautionary Language
By definition, the misinformation alleged to have been provided by a defendant is 
simply part and parcel of a “total mix” of information that is available in the public 
domain.  Where that total mix of information included the facts the defendants omitted,
or it otherwise added the necessary grain of salt to the defendant’s misrepresentations, 
defendants argue, the price of the stock already reflected the truth, and therefore no harm 
was done.136   Alternatively stated, and hearkening back to the pre-PSLRA “bespeaks 
caution” doctrine,137 no statement is material if it is effectively counterbalanced by 
cautionary language that is of sufficient “intensity and credibility” to neutralize it.138
Since 1995, issuer defendants have also been able to take advantage of a codified 
version of the “bespeaks caution” doctrine.  Under the PSLRA, a safe harbor is available 
for forward-looking statements made by issuers and underwriters, as long as these are 
accompanied by meaningful cautionary language.139 Some have questioned the safe 
136
 This defense argument necessarily implicates not only the materiality element, but also the reliance and 
even loss causation elements.  See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 
1997) (granting motion to dismiss because, as release of the information did not affect the company’s stock 
price, the information in question was not material).
137 See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991) (“While a misleading statement 
will not always lose its deceptive edge simply by joinder with others that are true, the true statements may 
discredit the other one so obviously that the risk of real deception drops to nil.”); Halperin v. eBanker 
USA.com, Inc., 295 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2002); In re Donald Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 
1993). See generally Ann Morales Olazábal, Safe Harbor for Forward Looking Statements Under the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:  What’s Safe and What’s Not?, 105 DICK. L. REV. 1, 9-11 
(Fall 2000); Jennifer O’Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine:  It’s Not Just Another State 
of Mind, 58 U.PITT.L.REV. 619 (1997).
138
 In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d. 1109, 1114-1115 (9th Cir. 1989) (court’s discussion of 
neutralizing information demonstrates the interrelation between materiality and reliance findings); .
139
 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a)(4).   
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harbor’s availability to analysts’ opinions.140 Regardless of whether analysts’ statements 
are covered by the safe harbor, its common law version – the “bespeaks caution” doctrine 
– remains.
Sometimes alternatively referred to as the “truth on the market” defense,141 in the 
analyst bias cases this argument takes several different shapes.  First is the position that 
other statements in the analyst’s reports disclosed the high risk nature of the investment at 
issue, perhaps neutralizing the analyst’s high opinion of the stock.  Second is the 
contention that the reports themselves disclosed conflicts like ownership interests in the 
stock recommended or the goal of obtaining or retaining investment banking business 
from the issuer. Last is the possibility that there was enough popular press and other 
publicly available information to adequately apprise investors of the conflicts of interest 
inherent in analysts’ recommendations.
A “bespeaks caution” argument was made and rejected in DeMarco v. Lehman 
Brothers Inc.,142 in which the defense maintained that because the subject research 
140
 It is an open question whether reports issued after the quiet period by underwriters’ analysts are covered 
by the safe harbor, given that such analysts are not acting on behalf of the issuer and are not themselves 
underwriters.  See Richard A. Rosen, “The Implications of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
The Statutory Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements After Two and a Half Years: Has it Changed 
the Law?  Has it Achieved What Congress Intended?,” 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 645, 648 (1998).
141
 This is a play on the name of the famous reliance presumption known as the “fraud on the market” 
doctrine.  Like the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, some view the “truth on the market” defense as one 
relating to materiality, others see it as a matter of reliance.  It has been adopted by the Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.  See Ganino v. Citizens Util. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir.2000) 
(recognizing truth on the market can render a misrepresentation immaterial, and noting that because the 
defense is “intensely fact-specific [it] is rarely an appropriate basis for dismissing a section 10(b) 
complaint” ); Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1492 (explaining that if the market has become aware of 
concealed information, the facts omitted by defendant would already be reflected in stock’s price, and the 
market will not be misled); Cooke v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 998 F.2d 1256, 1262-63 (4th Cir. 1993)
(affirming summary judgment where the market was fully aware of true information despite 
misrepresentation); Associated Randall Bank v. Griffin, Kubik, Stephens, & Thompson, Inc., 3 F.3d 208, 
213-14 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that “truth-on-the-market” is a corollary to the “fraud-on-the-market” 
doctrine); Fine v. Am. Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 299 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that presumption of 
reliance may be rebutted by showing market was unaffected by misrepresentation);  In re Apple Sec. 
Litig., 886 F.2d at 1115 (recognizing possibility of rebutting presumption of reliance).
142
 DeMarco v. Lehman Bros. Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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reports contained negative information as well as positive, plaintiffs were adequately 
informed of the risks.143  The court made short shrift of this contention, saying that the 
report’s award of the firm’s highest possible rating to the stock was “tantamount to a 
statement that the reader of the reports should discount the skeptical language.”144
Similarly, Judge Cote found the “bespeaks caution” doctrine inapplicable in In re 
Worldcom Sec. Litig.145
On the other hand, Senior District Judge Pollack ruled that the plaintiffs failed to 
overcome the “bespeaks caution” doctrine because the reports written by Merrill Lynch’s 
star Internet analyst, Henry Blodgett, contained sufficient specific risk-related 
disclosures, effectively neutralizing the stock’s high rating.146 While Blodgett’s reports
did contain repeated references to the stocks’ volatility, it is unclear whether they really 
differed substantively from those being issued by other analyst bias defendants at the 
time.  What is clear is that Judge Pollack was manifestly unwilling to permit plaintiffs in
any of the Merrill cases to proceed beyond the dismissal stage, which result was achieved 
not only with his “bespeaks caution” ruling but also by way of his reasoning on other 
elements of their cases, most notably reliance and loss causation.
143 Id. at 635.
144 Id. at 634.  The court also forecast that the defendants’ “highest ‘buy’” recommendation could be 
viewed as “completely overwhelm[ing]” any contrary cautions.  Id. at 635. 
145
 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that boiler-late cautionary language does not negate 
plaintiffs’ allegations that Grubman’s opinions were not rendered in good faith).  Judge Cote quotes the 
vivid, now-familiar analogy from In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd Partnership Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996):  “The doctrine of bespeaks caution provides no protection to someone who warns his 
hiking companion to walk slowly because there might be a ditch ahead when he knows with near certainty 
that the Grand Canyon lies one foot away.”  Id. at 72.
146
 In re Merrill Lynch Research Reports Sec. Litig. (re 24/7 RealMedia and Interliant), 273 F. Supp. 2d 
351, 377-378 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Merrill Lynch Research Reports Sec. Litig. (re Global Technology 
Fund), 272 F. Supp. 2d 243, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (same ruling in context of alleged violations of Section 
11 and 12 of 1934 Act).
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Compelling existing precedent on the subject of materiality and duty to disclose
aside, it is important to recall that the question is usually one of fact for the factfinder.147
Given this, the precise allegations involved, and/or the procedural status of the cases, 
materiality appears – in most courts considering analyst bias cases – to be either a matter 
to be resolved at a later date or a foregone conclusion.148 Yet bigger questions are 
presented by the remaining elements of the 10(b) case:  scienter, reliance, and causation, 
which are discussed in ensuing sections.
Section IV – Scienter
Nearly thirty years ago, in Hochfelder v. Hochfelder,149 the Supreme Court made 
it clear that scienter is a necessary element of a 10(b) claim.  In that case, the Court 
defined the necessary scienter as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, 
or defraud.”150 In the years since, courts have struggled to define what level of conduct, 
if any, short of intentional might qualify.  The Hochfelder Court expressly left open the 
question whether reckless conduct will suffice, noting only that:  “in certain areas of the 
law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of 
imposing liability for some act.”151 By the time the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
147
 Whether a statement is material is usually a question for the fact finder. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976).  Hence, a complaint should not be dismissed on the grounds that the alleged 
misstatements or omissions are immaterial unless they are “so obviously unimportant to a reasonable 
investor that reasonable minds could not differ on the question of their importance.” Ganino v. Citizens 
Util. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 2000) quoting Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 
1985).
148 See, e.g., Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros., 03 Civ. 5194 (SAS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9193 (S.D.N.Y. May 
21, 2004) (defendants asserting loss causation and time bar as bases for dismissal of complaint at pleading 
stage); but see DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens, at *16 (disposing of the materiality issue favorably to 
plaintiffs by ruling on motion to dismiss that “it is entirely reasonable that investors would consider analyst 
recommendations as part of the ‘total mix’ of information available when making purchases.”).
149
 425 U.S. 185 (1976).  
150 Id. at 194 n.12.  See generally 8 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3664 (3d ed. 
1991); Elaine E. Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst 
v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213, 218 (1977).
151
 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
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Act was passed in 1995, most of the circuits had determined that proof of recklessness 
was satisfactory as an alternative to conscious or intentional conduct.152
The PSLRA then muddied the waters by heightening the pleading standard for the 
required state of mind in a 10(b) action.153  Rather than alleging facts sufficient to enable 
a court simply to draw an inference or even a reasonable inference of recklessness or 
conscious misbehavior on the part of the defendant, plaintiffs are now required to allege –
with particularity – sufficient facts to permit the court to draw a strong inference of the 
required scienter.154 The PSLRA’s particularity provision thus requires plaintiffs to have 
a larger quantum of proof at their disposal before filing suit, not just to obtain it later in 
connection with the discovery process.155  In this way, the PSLRA sought to reduce
frivolous strike suits156 against securities issuers.157
152 See Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 
F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 1978); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 193 (3d Cir. 1981); Broad v. 
Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & 
Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023-25 (6th Cir. 1979); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 
1044 (7th Cir. 1977); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 783 (8th Cir., 1981); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 
1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1978); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1982): McDonald v. 
Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir. 1989); Dirks v. SEC, 220 U.S. App. D.C. 309, 681 
F.2d 824, 844 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).   
Though the Fourth Circuit had not explicitly found recklessness to be sufficient, district courts in that 
circuit had so held.  See In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litigation, 701 F.Supp. 1192, 1250 (E.D. Va. 1988) 
(citing cases), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Foremost Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Sav. 
Bank, 910 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1990).
153
 For a more detailed discussion of the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards, see Ann Morales 
Olazábal, The Search for Middle Ground:  Towards a Harmonized Interpretation of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act's New Pleading Standards,  6 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 153, 154-189 (Spring 2001).
154
 The relevant provision of the PSLRA reads as follows:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may recover money damages 
only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with 
respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving 
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
155
 The PSLRA provides for a mandatory discovery stay as follows: “…all discovery and other proceedings 
shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the court finds upon the motion of any 
party that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that 
party.  15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(3)(B).  Courts have generally observed this mandate as regards typical 
discovery.  See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch Research Reports Sec. Litig., No. 02 MDL 1484 (MP), 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2215 (February 18, 2004) (denying plaintiffs discovery).  A split of sorts appears to have 
developed among the district courts over whether this section prohibits discovery, prior to a motion to 
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The question thus has become not so much whether recklessness will suffice, 158
but what types of particularized fact allegations and what level of detail are necessary to 
enable the court to draw the required strong inference of scienter .159 The Second Circuit 
has held that to satisfy PSLRA’s scienter requirement, plaintiffs must allege either (a) 
facts showing “that defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud,” or (b) 
“facts . . . that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or 
recklessness.”160
Sufficient motive allegations in the Second Circuit “‘entail concrete benefits that 
could be realized by one or more of the false statements and wrongful nondisclosures 
alleged.’”161 Indeed, the court has clearly stated that motives that are generally possessed 
by public corporations and their directors and officers do not suffice; instead, plaintiffs 
must assert an actual, personal benefit to the individual defendants resulting from the 
dismiss, of documents produced to governmental entities.  Compare, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., 
Derivative & Erisa Litig., 2002 WL 31845114 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2002)(permitting partial lifting of stay 
with regard to documents made available to governmental entities because burden would be slight and 
documents had already been made available outside the litigation) with In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. 
Litig., 2003 WL 21035383 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2003) (holding that there is no exception for documents 
previously produced to governmental entities and plaintiffs failed to establish undue prejudice or need to 
preserve evidence under statute); In re HealthSouth Sec. Litig., CV-03-BE-1500-S, (N.D. Ala., Dec. 8, 
2003) (holding that to allow the plaintiffs to use documents previously produced to Congress would 
“create[ ] an absurd result in direct contravention of Congress’ intent to protect defendants from the 
possibility that documents produced to governmental entities may be used by the plaintiffs in formulating a 
complaint or in opposing a motion to dismiss.”)    
156 Strike suits have been defined as: “Shareholder derivative actions begun with the hope of winning large 
attorney fees or private settlements, and with no intention of benefitting corporation on behalf of which suit 
it is theoretically brought.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, Revised 4th Ed. (1968).
157 See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1999) (remarking 
that PSLRA was designed to deter “fishing expeditions”) citing Medhekar v. U. S. District Ct., 99 F.3d 
325, 328 (9th Cir. 1996) (“holding that Congress intended for complaints under the PSLRA to stand or fall 
based on the actual knowledge of the plaintiffs rather than information produced by the defendants after 
the action has been filed.”)  
158
 At first the PSLRA’s pleading standards threw the required state of mind into some flux, with the 
question of the necessary degree of recklessness being at the forefront, but it appears that a middle ground 
ultimately was reached.  Olazábal, supra note *. 
159 See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300,311 (2d Cir. 2000).
160 See, e.g., Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2001).  In enacting the heightened standard, 
Congress “did not change the basic pleading standard for scienter in [the Second] Circuit (except by the 
addition of the words ‘with particularity’)” Novak, 216 F.3d at 310.
161 Novak, 216 F.3d at 307 (quoting Shields, 25 F.3d at 1130).
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fraud.162  More specifically, the Second Circuit has found that motive and opportunity 
were sufficiently pleaded where the defendants’ misrepresentations were accompanied by 
insider trading, because “the allegation supports the inference that [defendant] withheld 
disclosures that would depress his stock until he had profitably sold his shares.”163
Similarly, it has concluded that a plaintiff sufficiently alleged motive where the 
purportedly fraudulent statements were quickly followed by the defendant’s sale of 80% 
of his holdings at a substantial profit.164  And, where an issuer failed to disclose 
information, artificially inflating its stock price with an eye toward using stock to make 
an acquisition, along with insider trading allegations, scienter had been adequately 
pleaded.165
As regards the other possible method of adequately pleading scienter, facts 
constituting “strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness,” 
the Second Circuit uncharacteristically has referred , in dicta in a case called Novak v. 
Kasaks, to several categories of cases that will qualify as establishing a strong inference 
of the required state of mind.166 These include allegations that defendants “engaged in 
162 Id. at 307-08. See also Chill v. General Electric Co., 101 F.3d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting as 
insufficient motive allegation plaintiffs’ assertion that defendant sought to justify its over $1 billion 
investment in a subsidiary); Acito v. Imcera Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting 
contention that officers were motivated to inflate the value of stock to increase their executive 
compensation); San Leandro Emergency Medical Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 
801, 813 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that defendant issuer’s desire to maintain a high bond or credit rating does 
not qualify as sufficient motive, because this desire can be imputed to all companies); Shields v. Citytrust 
Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that “plaintiff must do more than merely charge 
that executives aim to prolong the benefits of the positions they hold.”)
163 Stevelman v. Alias Research, Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 1999); Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 
1070 (2d Cir. 1985).
164
 In re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2001).
165
 Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 94 (2d Cir. 2000) (leaving open question whether artificial price 
inflation alone was sufficient).
166
 216 F.3d at 311.
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deliberately illegal behavior,”167 “knew facts or had access to information suggesting 
their public statements were inaccurate,”168 “failed to check information they had a duty 
to monitor,” or “ignored obvious signs of fraud.”169 In addition to providing this positive
guidance, the Novak court also set out several important limitations on what types of facts 
will not support a strong inference of scienter.  Thus, though issuers are responsible for 
disclosure of material facts reasonably available to them, they “need not be clairvoyant” 
or anticipate future events.170  Nor must corporate officers present an overly gloomy view 
of the issuer’s prospects.171 Further, and of particular interest in this context, the court in 
Novak explicitly warned that:
…there are limits to the scope of liability for failure adequately to monitor the 
allegedly fraudulent behavior of others.  Thus, the failure of a non-fiduciary 
accounting firm to identify problems with the defendant-company’s internal 
controls and accounting practices does not constitute reckless conduct sufficient 
for § 10(b) liability. Similarly, the failure of a parent company to interpret 
extraordinarily positive performance by its subsidiary … as a sign of problems 
and thus to investigate further does not amount to recklessness under the 
securities laws.  Finally, allegations of GAAP violations or accounting 
irregularities, standing alone, are insufficient to state a securities fraud claim. 
167 Id. at 308, citing Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc., 186 F.3d 157, 168-69 
(2d Cir. 1999); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
168
 Novak, 216 F.3d at 308, citing Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1989) and Goldman v. 
Belden, 754 F.2d at 1063, 1070.
169
 216 F.3d at 308, citing Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1978); 
SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir. 1998).
170
 216 F.3d at 309, citing Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978); Acito, 47 F.3d at 53.
171
 216 F.3d at 309, citing Stevelman, 174 F.3d at 85; Shields, 25 F.3d at 1129-30.
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Only where such allegations are coupled with evidence of “corresponding 
fraudulent intent,” might they be sufficient.172
Given the foregoing, whether a given plaintiff can allege facts sufficient to 
support the necessary inference of scienter is a deeply fact intensive inquiry.173
(a)  Existing Precedent
A number of cases preceding the recent spate of analyst bias cases looked at the 
types of facts that might support a finding of scienter where an analyst’s report was 
alleged to be fraudulent.  A study in the fact intensive nature of the scienter inquiry is 
Judge Folsom’s ruling on the defendant brokerage firms’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ 
Fourth Amended Complaint in the case of McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals, Ltd.174
following one of the largest mining discovery frauds ever perpetrated on investors,175 a 
class action suit was brought against, inter alia, analysts and three broker dealer firms, 
J.P. Morgan, Nesbitt Burns (of Canada), and Lehman Brothers, alleging they 
disseminated false and misleading statements and research reports on the mining 
exploration company called Bre-X.   Neither of the former defendants was able to 
172
 216 F.3d at 309, citing Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 1982); Chill, 101 
F.3d at 269-70; Stevelman, 174 F.3d at 84.
173 See, e.g., Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 142 (citation omitted) (calling scienter a “highly fact based inquiry”); 
Bruce A. Mann, Rule 10b-5:  Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of 
Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206, 1207 (1970) (demonstrating that courts “feign” 
consistent standards, while deciding cases based on their individual facts).
174
 197 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Texas 2001).  
175
 A number of books have been written about the infamous Indonesian gold scandal.  See, e.g., Jennifer 
Wells, BRE-X:  THE INSIDE STORY OF THE WORLD’S BIGGEST MINING SCAM (Texere, 1999); Diane Francis, 
BRE-X: THE INSIDE STORY (Key Porter Books, 1998); Douglas Goold & Andrew Willis, THE BRE-X FRAUD 
(McLelland & Stewart, 1997); James Whyte & Vivian Danielson, BRE-X: GOLD TODAY, GONE 
TOMORROW (Northern Miner Pr. Ltd., 1997). 
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extricate itself from the suit at the 12(b)(6) stage; the latter defendant was.176  The 
difference, of course, was in the facts pled against each of the analysts and firms.  
Nesbitt Burns’s analyst, Bianchini, was a trained geologist and allegedly Canada’s 
“superstar” gold analyst.  He was alleged to have owned a million or more shares of the 
inexperienced mining exploration company’s stock and, as one of Bre-X’s biggest 
“cheerleaders” in the Canadian market, to have had unique inside access to Bre-X 
insiders.177  Privy to various reports that should have raised serious red flags about the 
existence of any gold at the site Bre-X eventually claimed would yield more than 200 
million ounces of gold (making it the largest gold deposit in the world),178 Bianchini had 
both the expertise and information that should have put him on notice of the probability 
of so-called “salted” samples.179  Instead, Bianchini vouched for Bre-X’s management 
and consistently reported gold reserves in excess even of what the company was touting.  
Ultimately, when Bre-X’s unconventional assay techniques were made public, he also 
vowed to defend the company and to do damage control by calling institutional investors 
personally to push its stock.180
Further, while the fact was not specifically included in the court’s discussion 
against the firm, Nesbitt Burns was the Canadian investment bank and broker dealer that 
had also acted as one of the underwriters for Bre-X stock issuance.181  Unlike many of 
today’s analyst bias cases, no conflict of interest arising from that fact was apparently 
alleged.  Bianchini’s ownership interest in the stock and the collusive nature of the
176 Id. at 683, 693, 697.  No appellate review ensued, as the suit against J.P. Morgan, Nesbitt Burns, and 
Lehman Brothers subsequently was settled.  See McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals, Ltd., No. 5:97-CV-159, 
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26465 (E.D. Tex., July 3, 2002).  
177 Id. at 691-693.
178 Id. at 677.
179 Id. at 635.
180 Id. at 635, 637, 640.
181 Id. at 635.
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relationship between the analyst and the researched company no doubt drove the court’s 
straightforward conclusion that the facts alleged gave rise to a “strong inference that 
Bianchini was consciously aware of a substantial risk that [the gold discovery in 
Indonesia] was a fraud.”182  As such, the suit was permitted to proceed beyond the 
dismissal stage.
The facts against J.P. Morgan were similarly dooming.  J.P. Morgan was the 
American investment bank hired by Bre-X as a “financial advisor” to assist with 
negotiations with potential partners for a joint venture to develop the purported gold 
mine.183  As such, Morgan stood to earn millions of dollars in fees if a joint venture 
agreement could be consummated.184  After its engagement, J.P. Morgan and its geologist
analyst/investment banker, Doug McIntosh,185 was made privy to substantial inside 
technical data.186  In an effort to put the best face on Bre-X as a possible joint venture 
partner, J.P. Morgan discussed additional technical data with third party mining engineers 
that had previously analyzed Bre-X’s gold resource estimates and also reviewed reports 
that had been prepared by a potential joint venture partner.187  After reviewing all the 
data, J.P. Morgan decided which resource estimates ought to be published, aggressively 
spinning the available information.188  J. P. Morgan also commissioned an independent 
engineer’s report, which suggested changes in the assaying techniques to confirm the 
resource estimates, all of which suggestions Bre-X and J.P. Morgan ignored.189
182 Id. at 693.
183 Id. at 629.
184 Id. at 646.
185
 McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals, Ltd., 57 F. Supp. 2d 396, 422 (E.D. Texas, 1999) (opinion dismissing 
Second Amended Complaint without prejudice, as against all brokerage defendants)
186 Id. at 646-647.
187 Id. at 648.
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 650-651.
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Nonetheless, J.P. Morgan’s analyst/investment banker glowingly discussed Bre-X’s 
prospects in a conference call with other stock analysts and reporters.190  Later, J.P. 
Morgan was alleged to have been made privy to another independent analysis of Bre-X’s 
resource estimates and assaying results, which indicated unequivocally that there was 
very little or no gold at Bre-X’s mining site.  In response, J. P. Morgan apparently 
advised Bre-X to refuse any further concessions on due diligence at the mining site in its 
joint venture negotiations.191 These facts, in the court’s mind, gave rise to a strong 
inference of the necessary scienter on the part of J.P. Morgan.  Its motion to dismiss, 
therefore, was denied.192
Lehman Brothers’s fate was different.  Lehman’s mining analyst, McConvey, was 
neither an engineer nor geologist, nor was he in any way connected to Bre-X insiders, 
though coincidentally he had for six years acted as comptroller of Bre-X’s chosen joint 
venture partner, and thus he was familiar in a rudimentary way with the science and 
technology of the gold mining industry.193  The primary allegation against Lehman was 
that its analyst, who issued positive research reports and recommendations on Bre-X, 
read and summarized in one of his reports an outside expert’s report on the mine site that 
allegedly raised red flags about the veracity of Bre-X’s gold claims.  But belying 
plaintiffs’ contention that this indicated his complicity, the court pointed to the fact that 
McConvey repeated every fact in his report that allegedly “should have” raised a red flag.  
This, the court felt, negated any conscious wrongdoing.194  Thus, it held that at most 
190 Id. at 679-680.
191 Id. at 682.
192 Id. at 683.
193 Id. at 694-695.
194 Id. at 696.
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Lehman was negligent – not enough to support a 10b claim – and dismissed the suit 
against it.195
At least as far as the case against the analysts and broker dealers, the Bre-X 
opinion focused primarily on their scienter or lack thereof.  As such it stands primarily 
for the proposition that a class action suit may rise or fall based on the level of access to 
insiders and inside information that a given analyst had.  And, it stands to reason that that 
the more closely aligned an analyst’s financial interests are with those of the issuer, the 
more likely he or she will have participated in the fraud or at least knowingly advanced or 
concealed it.  
The analyst Smith’s scienter was also at issue in the Cybermedia case.196  Recall 
that there the plaintiffs had alleged that Smith plugged AOP stock as a “double your 
money” investment on a CNN appearance.  Plaintiffs’ bases for alleging a strong 
inference of scienter on Smith’s part were his potential increased compensation package 
if AOP’s stock price were to go up, and the fact he allegedly had “access to inaccurate 
data, which he failed to verify prior to touting AOP on television.”197  The court found 
195 Id. at 697.
196 183 F.Supp.2d 559 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).  The court in Cooper, discussed supra in text accompanying notes 
*-*, had also addressed the sufficiency of facts pled giving rise to the necessary element of scienter.  
However, as the case was decided under pre-PSLRA pleading standards, its cursorily analyzed holding in 
that regard is inapposite to today’s cases. Id. at 628.  The Cooper court found that allegations of false 
statements and of the conditions in existence at the issuer at the time, as well as an allegation that the 
investment banks’ “close relationship” with the issuer gave them access to inside information, were 
sufficient to give rise to an inference that the analyst defendants knew their reports were false, satisfying 
scienter pleading for purposes of a motion to dismiss.  Id.  Today, particular facts giving rise to a strong, 
not just reasonable, inference of scienter would need to be pled for plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss.  
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
197 Id. at 574.  The opinion does not further elaborate on the source of that information or the level of 
specificity with which such allegations were made.
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that the latter fact alone created a strong inference of scienter on Smith’s part, citing one 
of the scienter criteria established in the Second Circuit’s Novak v. Kasaks.198
Cases against non-analysts purporting to give independent stock advice also seem 
to support the notion that the current analyst bias cases can satisfy the scienter element of 
a 10b claim.  For example, where one publishes ostensibly independent research that is in 
effect “bought and paid for” by the issuer, failure to disclose that fact has been held to 
support a finding of intentional or at best extremely reckless behavior, giving rise to 
10(b) liability.199  Likewise, intent to profit from the price inflation likely to be caused by 
one’s recommendation also has been held to establish at least a triable issue with regard 
to scienter.200  Knowing violations of industry regulations may also permit an inference 
of recklessness.201
(b) Pending Analyst Bias Cases
198 Id. at 574, quoting Novak for the proposition that “[a] strong inference arises where the complaint 
alleges that ‘defendants: ... (3) knew facts or had access to information suggesting that their public 
statements were not accurate ....’”  Id. The Novak case also articulates the rule that any such contrary 
information must be identified with particularity in the complaint.  216 F.3d at 309.  There was no 
discussion in Cybermedia of whether the particularity hurdle set by the PSLRA was also met.
199 See, e.g., SEC v. Gorsek, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Ill. 2001) (granting summary judgment in favor of 
plaintiffs on issue of defendants’ liability under both Section 17(b) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act).
200 See Zweig v. Hearst, 594 F.2d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir. 1979).  Of course this case predates the heightened 
pleading standards established by the PSLRA, but its rationale is still sound assuming sufficient 
particularity of facts is present in the complaint:  “[defendant columnist] knew the material facts he failed 
to reveal. Moreover, there is at the very least a triable issue of fact as to whether [he] intended to benefit 
from the column, from which he intentionally omitted any mention of his financial interests [in the stock he 
glowingly recommended].”  Further supporting the scienter allegations in that case was the fact that the 
defendant made it a practice to purchase the stocks he would recommend prior to publishing his columns, 
often at prices below market directly from the issuers, which were small regional companies, and then trade 
on the inflated prices his column created.  Id. at 1265.
201 See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 1998) (re: 
duty of best execution); Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993) (re: 
suitability rule).  A pre-PSLRA case from the Ninth Circuit also holds that breach of a broker’s duty to 
make suitability recommendations is a “reckless violation of Section 10(b),” but given the Ninth Circuit’s 
much more lax pleading standards at the time, the case is of questionable continuing vitality.  Vucinich v. 
Paine, Webber, Jackson, & Curtis, Inc., 803 F.2d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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Typical of the pending analyst bias cases is DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens, 
Inc.,202 in which the defendant brokerage is alleged to have owned a substantial number 
of shares in the company researched.  Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant analysts’ 
reports recommended “buy” during the lockup period and throughout the time the broker-
dealer unloaded its shares.  District Judge Lynch found these allegations adequate to 
support either prong of the traditional Second Circuit scienter test.203 Motive, the court
found, was properly alleged by facts showing the brokerage’s ownership of the shares, 
and opportunity via the use of the research reports to encourage investors to purchase 
shares at prices defendant believed to be inflated.204  Alternatively or in addition, Judge 
Lynch felt that a strong inference of conscious misbehavior or recklessness was 
sufficiently alleged by identifying the analyst’s contrary internal sell recommendation, 
bookended closely in time as it was by his positive publicly disseminated research reports 
and buy recommendations.205
Judge Scheindlin’s ruling in Fogarazzo206 was similar.  In that case, she found 
two concrete personal benefits supporting motive had been alleged:  (1) artificial price 
inflation to support defendant’s own sales of the stock recommended, and (2) 
“remarkable coincidences” highly suggestive of a quid pro quo between defendants and 
securities issuers of positive reports for investment banking business.207 She also found 
more broadly that allegations the defendants “were issuing recommendations that were 
contrary to their true evaluations of the relevant securities or were otherwise tainted by 
202
 No. 03 Civ. 590 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265 (S.D.N.Y. January 8, 2004).
203
 DeMarco at *17, citing Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1995)(quoting Shields v. 
Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1994)), and In re Worldcom, 2003 WL 21219049, at *16-17.
204
 DeMarco at *13-15
205 Id.
206
 No. 03 Civ. 5194 (SAS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9193 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2004).
207 Id. at *60-61.
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conflicts of interest” constituted strong circumstantial evidence of conscious 
misbehavior.208 District Judge Cote’s ruling in Worldcom, with facts strongly analogous 
to the high level of entanglement between the issuer and the Nesbitt Burns defendants in 
Bre-X, likewise found sufficient both motive and opportunity allegations and claims 
suggesting conscious misbehavior or recklessness.209
Another court took a little different tack when presented with direct evidence 
supporting the plaintiff’s contention that the analyst did not truly hold the opinion he 
disseminated.  In DeMarco v. Lehman Brothers, District Judge Rakoff viewed the 
contrary opinion contained in the defendant’s emails as sufficient to establish a prima 
facie case of both falsity and scienter:  “… the stark difference between what Stanek was 
effectively recommending to readers of his reports, i.e., “buy,” and what he was 
effectively recommending to preferred customers in his emails, i.e., “sell,” supports a 
reasonable inference of an intent to mislead and defraud the former.”210  Despite the 
rather unfortunate reference to the old standard for pleading scienter (facts supporting a 
“reasonable inference” rather than “strong inference” of the requisite state of mind), the
case nonetheless appear to return the correct result.211
208 Id. at *58.
209
 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 425-426 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
210 Id. at  7; see also Podany v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2290, *20 (S.D.N.Y. 
February 10, 2004).
211 See also Newby v. Enron (In Re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig.), MDL 1446, 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25037 (S. D. Texas, November 12, 2003) (denying motion to dismiss and finding that 
plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded scienter in case alleging that Enron insiders on the one hand and broker-
dealer UBS Warburg and its analyst Ron Barone and retail division on the other, had a cozy and conflicted 
relationship sufficient to establish a “strong inference of severe recklessness,” despite reciting that 
defendant analyst and broker-dealer “knew or should have known” about deteriorating financial condition 
at Enron).
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Predictably, Senior Judge Pollack has found to the contrary.  In one of the Merrill 
Lynch cases before him, 212 Judge Pollack rejected plaintiffs’ contention that defendants’ 
“buy” and “accumulate” recommendations (predicting 20% and 10% price increases in 
the ensuing 12 months) were reckless.  Instead, he felt the defendants’ conduct fell 
directly within Novak’s proscription against liability for failure to “anticipate[ ] future 
events  and [make] certain disclosures earlier than they actually did.”213  Moreover, in 
Judge Pollack’s view, the plaintiffs failed to allege compelling facts regarding motive and 
opportunity to commit fraud.  He found the broker-dealers’ effort to attract investment 
banking business and the analyst’s personal motive to increase his bonus compensation 
insufficient as a matter of law, calling these examples of motives held by many, for 
which there is no liability.214
Judge Pollack’s premise that bubble economy investors were “gamblers” and his 
opinion that the bursting of the bubble was a separate and intervening cause of investors’ 
losses (apparently not contributed to by defendants in these cases), render his view on 
scienter unsurprising.  The remaining trial judges in the Southern District of New York 
have found, in the more serious and factually supported analyst bias cases, sufficient 
allegations to establish a triable issue with regard to scienter.  The author does not 
disagree.
Section V – Reliance
212
 In re Merrill Lynch Research Reports Sec. Litig. (eToys.com), 289 F. Sup. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
213 Id. at 427-428.
214 Id. at 428, citing Zucker v. Sasaki, 963 F. Supp. 301, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) for the proposition that 
“Receipt of compensation and the maintenance of a profitable professional business relationship . . . does 
not constitute a sufficient motive for purposes of pleading scienter,” and Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 
F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995) for the proposition that “incentive compensation is not a basis for allegations of 
fraud.”
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In a 10(b) claim, the reliance element “is a causa sine qua non, a type of ‘but for’ 
requirement: had the investor known the truth he would not have acted.”215 Proof of 
reliance, also sometimes called “transaction causation,” depends on the type of case.216
Establishing individual reliance is not much of an obstacle in cases involving plaintiffs 
who dealt directly with the defendant(s) and who considered a misrepresented fact when 
entering into the securities transaction.  But today not all 10(b) cases involve direct 
reliance by individual plaintiffs.  Indeed, there are two other basic fact scenarios in which 
a presumption of reliance is permitted.  First, the Affiliated Ute presumption, where the 
plaintiffs’ claims are based upon material omissions,217 and second, the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine, which presumes reliance where the subject securities transactions 
involved not direct “face to face” dealings with the defendants, but instead are made in 
215
 Huddleston v. Herman & McLean, 640 F. 2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981).
216
 The Fifth Circuit described the interplay between reliance and transaction causation as follows:  “Courts 
sometimes consider the reliance component of the Rule 10b-5 action to be a part of the causation element. 5 
A. Jacobs, The Impact of Rule 10b-5 § 64.01(a), at 3-221 (Supp.1980). In this context, the term ‘transaction 
causation’ is used to describe the requirement that the defendant’s fraud must precipitate the investment 
decision. Reliance is necessarily closely related to ‘transaction causation.’”  Huddleston, 640 F. 2d at 549 
n.24.
217
 Affiliated Ute, cited in Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 174 (3d 
Cir 2001) in the context of class certification motion in a 10(b) case against a broker-dealer who was 
alleged to have omitted to disclose a practice that resulted in higher than necessary prices to its customers.  
In holding that the burden of rebutting the presumption of reliance was properly on defendants, the Newton 
court also referred the reader to the following analogous cases regarding the Affiliated Ute presumption of 
reliance in material omission cases:  “Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 786-87 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding 
individual questions of reliance in securities class action involving investment in tax shelters did not 
preclude certification). … Grandon v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 147 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1998) (‘A 
broker-dealer commits fraud (in violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5) by charging customers excessive 
markups without proper disclosure.’); Bank of Lexington & Trust Co. v. Vining-Sparks Sec., Inc., 959 F.2d 
606, 613 (6th Cir. 1992) (‘The failure to disclose exorbitant mark-ups violates section 78j(b) and Rule 10b-
5.’); Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 942-46 (3d Cir. 1985) (reliance does not bar 
private securities fraud action involving nondisclosure of fraudulent credit terms on margin accounts); 
Ettinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 177, 180, 182 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (reliance 
not an issue in securities class action alleging securities dealer failed to disclose improper markups on 
bonds).”  Id. at 175.
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reliance on the impersonal market to establish the value of the security in which they 
transacted.218
Both of the reliance presumptions may arise in the analyst bias cases.  The 
Affiliated Ute presumption, for example, was held expressly to apply in the WorldCom
suit, where much of the plaintiffs’ claim is based upon allegations of a so-called “illicit 
quid pro quo relationship” between the broker-dealer and analyst, Salomon Smith Barney 
and Jack Grubman, on the one hand, and WorldCom and its executives, particularly 
Bernard Ebbers, on the other.219  In assessing the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market 
theory to the suit, Judge Denise Cote’s order certifying the class in that case characterizes 
the case as one involving not only misrepresentations (in the form of false opinions) but 
also omissions, to which the Affiliated Ute presumption will apply.220  This was not a 
controversial finding.  However, defendants in the analyst bias cases have strenuously 
argued in false opinion cases that the other reliance presumption, the fraud-on-the-market 
theory, does not apply to them.  A brief historical survey of that doctrine, thus, is in order.  
Since at least 1975, plaintiffs relying on the fraud-on-the-market theory have been 
able to bring securities fraud class actions even though they may not have heard or read 
the offending statement or document in which misrepresentations or omissions were 
allegedly made.221  In lieu of alleging and proving direct individual reliance, plaintiffs 
can assert the “fraud-on-the-market” theory of reliance and transaction causation by 
218
 Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 241-42; Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 178; In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 
1419 n.8.
219
 In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 267, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
220 Id. at 298, 301.
221
 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first to expressly recognize the fraud-on-the-market theory.  
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).  The Second Circuit did so in 1981.  Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 
F.2d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1981).   See also Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC 
Rule 10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 590 (1975) (discussing Affiliated Ute’s reliance presumption where 
omitted information is material, and the then incipient fraud-on- the-market theory).
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alleging the materiality of the subject information.222  Sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1988 in the case of Basic v. Levinson,223 the theory is 
based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market the price 
of a company’s stock is determined by the available material information 
regarding the company and its business … Misleading statements will therefore 
defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers to do not directly rely on the 
misstatements.224
In Basic, the Court provided very little guidance with regard to how the 
presumption is to be established beyond validating its use in securities fraud class action 
cases involving shares that “were traded on an efficient market.”225 As a result, there has 
been inconsistent application thereof in the lower courts.226  The Basic Court did make 
clear, however, that the presumption of reliance may be rebutted by “any showing that 
severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and… the price received (or paid) 
by the plaintiff.”227 One possible rebuttal is the previously discussed “truth-on-the-
market” defense.228  However, for this defense to be adequately established, the 
222 See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving 
Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1 (1982).
223
 485 U.S. 224 (1988), quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-1161 (3rd Cir. 1986).
224
 Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-42.
225 Id. at 248 n. 27 (citing Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 1986) regarding the four 
elements ).
226 See generally Paul A. Ferillo, et al., The “Less Than” Efficient Captial Markets Hypothesis: Requiring 
More Proof From Plaintiffs in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 89-102 (Winter 
2004) (illustrating various approaches taken by district courts to requiring proof of stock’s trading in an 
“efficient market”); Jeffery L. Oldham, Comment, Taking “Efficient Markets” out of the Fraud-on- the-
Market Doctrine after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 995, 1014 (Winter 
2003) (describing inconsistent results in district courts).
227
 Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.
228
 Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2000); Associated Randall Bank v. Griffin, 
Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, Inc., 3 F.3d 208, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1993); Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 
1376 (9th Cir. 1994).  Cf. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 (noting that one way the presumption of reliance in a 
fraud-on-the-market case may be rebutted is by proving that “the ‘market makers’ were privy to the truth”).  
See generally Robert Norman Sobol, The Benefit of the Internet: The World Wide Web and the Securities 
Law Doctrine of Truth-on-the-Market, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 85, 90-91 (Fall 1999) (describing the truth on 
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defendant must establish that “corrective information … [was] conveyed to the public 
‘with a degree of intensity and credibility sufficient to counter-balance effectively any 
misleading information created by’ the alleged misstatements.”229  At least one 
commentator suggests that this makes the presumption all but irrebuttable.230  Most 
commonly, it appears that courts seem to prefer to permit this question to go to the 
jury.231
As the fraud-on-the-market doctrine itself is relatively new, its application in 
existing cases involving stock recommendations also is a somewhat novel phenomenon.  
Older cases tended to involve face to face transactions and therefore individual reliance.  
For those that involved more market wide frauds, perhaps the application of the fraud-on-
the-market theory was a foregone conclusion, assuming the securities at issue were 
viewed as trading on efficient markets.232 But criticism of the fraud-on-the-market 
the market doctrine and its evidentiary burden).  See also notes n+1, n+3, infra.  A nearly identical 
argument, in the form of the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, also frequently is made in an attempt to rebut a 
finding of materiality.  See note * and accompanying text, supra.
229 See, e.g., Ganino, 228 F.3d at 167 (quoting In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th
Cir. 1989).  In an extreme case, a court found that the truth was transmitted to the public with even “more 
credibility and neutrality than was any purported misstatement from defendants.”  White v. H.R. Block, 
Inc., 02 Civ. 2289 (MBM), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14522, *36-37 (S.D.N.Y., July 28, 2004) (dismissing 
suit where abundant facts supporting truth on the market defense defeated plaintiffs’ use of fraud-on-the-
market reliance presumption).   
230
 Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money do the Mentoring:  How Institutional Investors Can 
Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L. J. 2053, 2077 (1995) (remarking that 
feasible possibilities for rebutting the presumption “represent null, or close to null, sets”); Andrew R. 
Simmonds, et al., Dealing with Anomalies, Confusion and Contradiction in Fraud on the Market Securities 
Class Actions, 81 KY. L.J. 123, 141 (1993) (noting that making the necessary showing to rebut the 
presumption “will be virtually impossible”).  But see In re Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., 721 F. Supp. 1133, 
1138-39 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (applying defense to support grant of summary judgment). 
231
 Ganino, 228 F.3d at 167-68; see also Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9th Cir. 1996) (opining 
that such a finding should be made on summary judgment only if “no rational jury could find that the 
market was misled”).  The same has proven to be true in some of the analyst bias cases in which the issue 
has been raised so far.  See, e.g., In re Worldcom Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392 (quoting disclaimer 
language contained in analysts’ reports); DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265 at 
*25.
232
 At least one commentator has opined that “since virtually all securities covered by a research analyst are 
traded on an efficient market, a plaintiff could sue an analyst without need to prove reliance or transaction 
causation.”  Gross, supra note *, at 673.  This conclusion seems to beg the question raised by defense 
counsel in the analyst bias cases.
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doctrine has gained some ground in recent years,233 setting the stage for a number of 
defense arguments in the current spate of analyst bias cases.  
Nonetheless, the fraud-on-the-market doctrine has been successfully asserted by a 
number of plaintiffs on motions to dismiss.  For example, District Judge Lynch has ruled 
on a motion to dismiss in the DeMarco v. Robertson Stephenson case that there is no 
reason not to apply the fraud-on-the-market theory to analysts (a question perhaps left 
open by Basic, which involved alleged fraudulent statements by an issuer):
… defendants do not cite a single case holding or even suggesting that the fraud-
on-the-market theory extends only to misrepresentations made by individuals
presumed to possess inside knowledge.  Nor do economic principles underlying 
the doctrine support that assertion, since efficient market theory does not exclude 
non-insider information from the mix of information factored into share price.
***
It is not for the Court to decide, on a motion to dismiss, whether or to what extent 
the market functioned efficiently.  These are issues of fact for trial.  Accepting the 
facts in the complaint as true, plaintiffs have adequately pled transaction causation 
by alleging that fraudulent opinions published in [defendant’s] research reports 
distorted the … share price set by the market, and that the plaintiffs relied on the 
integrity of that price when purchasing [the] stock.234
This is consistent with dismissal stage rulings by District Judges Scheindlin and Cote, 
both of whom found that simply alleging that the market relied on the subject analyst 
reports could support the requirement that plaintiff allege facts showing reliance or 
233 See, e.g., Oldham, supra note *. 
234
 DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens, 03 Civ. 590 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265 (S.D.N.Y. January 8, 
2004) at *21, 24.
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transaction causation.235  Conversely, Judge Pollack, in dismissing several of the Merrill 
Lynch cases, apparently has used the fraud-on-the-market theory as the lynchpin for his 
finding of plaintiffs’ failure to adequately show loss causation, or alternatively in one 
case that the fraud-on-the-market theory is inapplicable based on a truth- on-the-market 
kind of analysis.236
Once beyond the dismissal stage, the question is whether plaintiffs can rely on the 
fraud-on-the-market theory to support class certification.  Perhaps the biggest debate in 
this regard is precisely at what point procedurally the presumption should be determined 
to apply.  The questions of market efficiency and whether a particular analyst’s report or 
reports affected the relevant market require a look behind the pleadings.  On the one 
hand, the Supreme Court has cautioned that fact-intensive determinations on the merits 
generally should not be adjudicated at the class certification stage.237  On the other hand, 
the presumption in securities class actions is what facilitates certification of the class, as 
when it applies it obviates the possibility that individual questions regarding reliance will 
235
 In re Initial Public Offerings Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that 
efficiency of the relevant market is not to be determined at the dismissal stage, as it is a mixed question of 
fact and law); In re Worldcom, Inc., Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that “at 
the pleading stage [assertion of the fraud-on-the-market theory] satisfies plaintiffs’ burden of alleging 
transaction causation.”
236
 In opinions in the 24/7 Real Media and Interliant case, and the e-Toys, Inc. (and seven others) case, 
Judge Pollack hinges his finding that loss causation is inadequately shown on the fact the cases allege  
frauds on the market.  In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 
363-368 and n.24 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 289 F. 
Supp. 2d 416, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  Later in the 24/& Real Media and Interliant opinion, however, in a 
short paragraph Judge Pollack declares that the analyst reports there in contention could not have operated 
as a fraud on the market, since information about the conflicts of interest and deceptive rating system in 
alleged that case were “known to the market and were specifically disclosed in the Sector Reports.”  Id. at 
375.     
237
 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974) (holding that courts should not adjudicate 
the merits at the class certification stage).  See also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa USA Inc. (In re Visa 
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig.), 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that class certification is 
not the occasion for analyzing the case on its merits).
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predominate over common ones.238  Given these competing notions, courts have differed 
with respect to their perspective on when the presumption’s application should be 
decided.239  Notably, the Basic opinion itself was issued in connection with class 
certification.240  At least one other Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a district court’s 
use of the presumption at the class certification stage in a 10(b) case.241
Only two of the pending analyst bias cases have reached this procedural status 
thus far; in both of these the analyst and broker-dealer defendants’ main argument against 
class certification was inapplicability of the fraud-on-the-market theory to analysts’ 
reports.”242   The two cases came out on opposite sides of the issue.  In the Worldcom
suit, District Judge Cote refused to engage in a battle of the experts at that procedural 
juncture,243 and found the presumption to apply:244
The SSB Defendants argue essentially that it would be inappropriate to apply the 
presumption of reliance to a Section 10(b) claim brought against an analyst 
238
 The Eisen case does not stand for the proposition that a district judge should make class certifications 
solely on the basis of what is pled.  In Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, the Court said “sometimes it 
may be necessary for the [district] court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the 
certification question.” 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982).  See also Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, No. 03-1629, 
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 9305 (4th Cir., May 12, 2004) at *24; Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 
672, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2001). 
239 See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 651 DUKE L. J.
1251-1273-74 (2002) (identifying split in the courts as to whether the fraud-on-the-market presumption 
should be adjudicated at the class certification stage), and cases cited therein.
240 Basic, 485 U.S. at 242, 247.      
241 Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3rd Cir 2001) (affirming denial of 
class certification based on plaintiffs’ failure to show any economic loss, but approving application of 
fraud-on-the-market presumption).
242
 In re Worldcom Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 267, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 03 Civ. 
3470 (JSR), 03 Civ. 3705 (JSR), 03 Civ. 4511 (JSR), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12438 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 
2004).  
243 Id. at 300 (noting that defendants treat the complaint as an expert report, and finding nonetheless that 
“defendants have not shown that [defense expert]’s analysis will succeed in rebutting the presumption of 
reliance such that it is appropriate to conclude that there will be no such presumption available at trial and 
that individual issues will come to predominate over common ones.”) 
244
 She also based her class certification decision as regards reliance on the fact that reliance need not be 
shown in omission cases.  See note * (and accompanying text?) supra. [Affiliated Ute presumption in 
Worldcom case.]
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because statements by a non-issuer are not “likely” to affect the market price. 
They point out that Basic approved the presumption of reliance in that case 
because the presumption was consistent with common sense and probability. … 
They assert that it is consistent with neither to do so here. To make this argument, 
the SSB Defendants ignore virtually every allegation in the lengthy Amended 
Complaint (as well as evidence uncovered through discovery and submitted in 
support of this motion).  At no point in their briefs do they acknowledge 
Grubman's alleged role as the premier analyst in the telecommunications industry. 
Nothing in the defendants’ briefs addresses why Grubman was paid 
approximately $ 20 million a year in compensation by SSB to be its 
telecommunications analyst if his analyst reports were irrelevant to the market. 
Nothing in the defendants’ briefs addresses why Grubman issued reports 
announcing that WorldCom was his favorite stock, offering the opinion that “we 
would be aggressive buyers at these prices,” and “strongly” reiterating his “Buy 
rating on WorldCom,” … if his views were not likely to affect the decisions made 
by WorldCom investors. The plaintiffs have shown that it comports with both 
common sense and probability to apply the presumption here. The defendants 
may attempt to rebut the presumption at trial.245
245 Id. at 299. (citations and footnote omitted).  Similar reasoning was employed by District Judge Lynch in 
his refusal to dismiss:  “An underwriter like [defendant] that has a research department engaged in the 
business of analyzing companies in order to disseminate to the public information and opinions about 
specific securities clearly intends that the market take into account its recommendations to buy or sell such 
securities.  … It is disingenuous, to say the least, for defendants to now argue that their published purchase 
recommendations are somehow excluded from the information available to market actors …”  DeMarco v. 
Robertson Stephens  at *21-22.
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This ruling was the subject of a petition for interlocutory appeal, which was granted by 
the Second Circuit in late 2003.246   The SEC filed an amicus brief arguing on the side of 
the investors.247  However, just days before the scheduled oral argument on the appeal, 
the SSB defendants settled out of the case and the issue eluded decision.248  Nonetheless, 
there is something to be gleaned from the opinion granting the appeal.  Though the 
Second Circuit refuses to articulate an evidentiary standard for application of the fraud-
on-the-market presumption at the class certification stage, it does seemingly discuss with 
approval the Seventh Circuit’s refusal to certify the class in West v. Prudential Securities, 
Inc.249 where the plaintiffs failed to adduce admissible evidence that – when taken most 
favorably to the plaintiff – would establish prima facie entitlement to the presumption.
The WorldCom suit is somewhat unique in this setting, as in that case there is no 
dispute that there was an efficient market for WorldCom stock.250  When it comes to any 
of the more thinly traded and volatile technology stocks that are the subject of other more 
typical analyst bias cases, the defense that the presumption should not apply because the 
stock was not traded in an efficient in market will undoubtedly have more sway, 
246
 Hevesi v. Citigroup, Inc., 336 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining December 31, 2003 order granting 
interlocutory appeal).
247
 “Thus the Court imposed no limitation that the source of the information be the company itself. The 
Commission believes that applying the presumption to analysts is consistent both with economic studies 
showing the market effect of analyst reports and with their very purpose – providing information on which 
to base investment decisions.”  Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities and Exchange Commission, at 10, 
available at www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/wchevesi_amicus.htm (Last modified 4/20/04).
248
 Mitchell Pacelle, Citigroup Will Pay $2.65 billion to Settle WorldCom Investor Suit, WALL ST. J., May 
11, 2004, at A1.  A copy of the Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement filed in the case is available at  
http://slw.issproxy.com/securities_litigation_blo/files/wcomsettlement_notice.pdf (last viewed August 6, 
2004).  No other interlocutory appeal on this issue presently is pending in any of the other analyst bias 
cases.
249
 282 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2002) (reversing class certification order that was premised on application of 
the fraud-on-the-market reliance presumption in case involving artificial price inflation allegedly caused by 
non-public statements made by a stockbroker to a number of clients). 
250
 Worldcom, 219 F.R.D. at 294.
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regardless of procedural timing of the issue’s consideration.251  Moreover, regardless of 
efficiency generally and depending on the precise facts presented, a court could doubt the 
impact any particular analyst report had on the subject stock’s price.
This is precisely what led Judge Rakoff to deny class certification in the other 
case:  DeMarco v. Lehman Bros.252
[A] statement of opinion emanating from a research analyst is far more subjective 
and far less certain, and often appears in tandem with conflicting opinions from 
other analysts as well as new statements from the issuer. As a result, no automatic 
impact on the price of a security can be presumed and instead must be proven and 
measured before the statement can be said to have “defrauded the market” in any 
material way that is not simply speculative… In some cases, sophisticated 
statistical techniques may enable a skilled investigator to determine that a given 
analyst’s opinion of a given security has indeed materially impacted market price 
so as to warrant application of the “fraud-on-the-market” doctrine.  But in other 
cases the claim of measurable impact on the marketplace will be too speculative 
to support such an application.253
251
 Much has been made of noted securities law Professor John Coffee’s opinion that “only in a case where 
the publication of the [analyst] report clearly moved the market in a measurable fashion would the ‘fraud 
on the market’ doctrine seem fairly applicable.”  John C. Coffee, Jr., Security Analyst Litigation, N.Y.L.J., 
(Sept. 20, 2001), at 5 (premising his conclusion on 1976 and 1999 academic studies showing respectively 
that analyst’s predictions have not been found to be particularly accurate and that the opinions of analysts 
associated with an issuer’s underwriters do not generally move the market for that stock), quoted in Hevesi 
v. Citigroup, Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 79 n.7 (2d Cir. 2004); DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 03 Civ. 3470 (JSR), 03 
Civ. 2705 (JSR), 03 Civ. 4511 (JSR), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12438 at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2004).  
Similarly, Ferrillo, et al. argue that “plaintiffs should be required to earn their rebuttable presumption of 
reliance by at least making some concrete showing, through a price reaction analysis, that the stock upon 
which they are suing behaved in an ‘efficient’ manner, by responding rapidly to corporate news and events 
and performing as finance theory would predict in the absence of such.”  78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. at 85.
252
 DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12438.
253 Id. at  **7-9.
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Judge Rakoff conceded at some length that the “investor is entitled to assume that the 
analyst is providing his honest opinion, rather than, as here alleged, lying in order to 
manipulate the market for the benefit of an issuer for which the analyst’s employer is 
providing lucrative services,” and that some analysts “may have the ability to influence 
market prices on the basis of their recommendations.”254  Nonetheless, Judge Rakoff 
found the proof before him not sufficient to “make a prima facie showing that the 
analyst’s statements materially impacted the market price in a reasonably quantifiable 
respect.”255
In the end, then, it appears that a key factual question to be answered in each 
analyst bias case is whether the analyst’s report(s) actually moved the market for the 
stock that is the subject of the complaint.  If it did, market efficiency for that stock 
generally may become irrelevant, and loss causation also will likely be established.256
The SEC has taken the position that analysts’ reports do impact market prices and are 
actually used by investors, including institutional investors, citing a number of financial 
experts’ compelling academic papers on the subject.257  Whether it is viewed as a 
254 Id. at **5-6.
255 Id. at  *9.  Plaintiffs relied primarily on an expert report prepared by Frank S. Torchio, who also has 
prepared testimony for the WorldCom case.  The court found that Torchio’s report in the DeMarco case 
stood in “notable contrast” to the report he gave in Worldcom, which “isolated the statements fo the 
particular analyst there involved on days in which there was no confounding information.”  In DeMarco, 
the court found Torchio’s substantially weaker analysis of the Lehman analyst, Stanek’s, effect on the 
market for RealNetworks’s stock to be “so transparently unreliable as to be inadmissible as a matter of 
law.” Id. at *14.  
256 See Section VI infra.
257 See, e.g., Paul J. Irvine, Analysts’ Forecasts and Brokerage Firm Trading, 79 ACCT. REV. 125 (2004); 
Alon Brav & Reuven Lehavy, An Empirical Analysis of Analysts’ Target Prices:  Short-term 
Informativeness and Long-term Dynamics, 58 J. FIN. 1933 (2003); Cristi A. Gleason and Charles M.C. Lee, 
Analyst Forecast Revisions and Market Price Discovery, 78 ACCT. REV. 193 (2003); Jeffrey A. Busse & T. 
Clifton Green, Market Efficiency in Real Time, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 415 (2002); Brad Barber, et al., Can
Investors Profit from the Prophets?  Security Analyst Recommendations and Stock Returns, 56 J. FIN. 531 
(2001); Rick A. Cooper, et al., Following the Leader: A Study of Individual Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts, 
61 J. FIN. ECON. 383 (2001); Laurie Krigman, et al., Why do Firms Switch Underwriters?, 60 J. FIN. ECON.
245 (2001); Kent L. Womack, Do Brokerage Analysts’ Recommendations Have Investment Value?, 51 J. 
FIN. 137 (1996); Scott E. Stickel, The Anatomy of the Performance of Buy and Sell Recommendations, FIN. 
63
prerequisite to application of the fraud-on-the-market presumption in a given case, or as 
the key to proof of loss causation, it appears that the fact an analysts’ report(s) moved the 
market will be instrumental to a finding of liability, whether by a judge at class 
certification, or ultimately by a jury at trial. The question of loss causation is discussed in 
more detail in the next Section.
Section VI – (Loss) Causation 
Causation is the next, and in this context possibly the most contentious, element 
of a 10(b) cause of action.  Theoretically anyway, causation has two parts:  transaction 
causation and loss causation.  Transaction causation, akin to reliance,258 was discussed in 
the previous section.  The other part, “loss causation,” demonstrates that the fraudulent 
misrepresentation or omission actually caused the damages or loss suffered.259  This 
element is statutory now, having been codified by the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act.  In that regard, the PSLRA provides:  “in any private action arising under 
this chapter, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the 
defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to 
recover damages.”260
This codification of the element did not clarify the loss causation standard to be 
used by the courts.  In fact, since well before the passage of the PSLRA the topic of loss 
causation has been somewhat unsettled in the Circuits.  The Eighth and Ninth Circuits 
have adopted a relatively loose causation requirement, simply requiring the plaintiffs to 
ANALYSTS J. 24 (Sept/Oct. 1995).   More anecdotally, journalists frequently report on stock prices’ 
apparent reactions to analysts’ calls.  See, e.g.,  Karen Talley, Genentech, Cree Fall After Analysts Cut 
Ratings, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2004), at C4; 
258 See, e.g., Suez Equity Investors.
259
 Suez Equity Investors, 250 F.3d at 95-96. (distinguishing between transaction causation, which is more 
like reliance, and loss causation, which is the causal connection between the fraud and the plaintiffs’ 
losses).
260
 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).
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show “some causal nexus” between their loss and the defendants’ misconduct.261  The
remaining courts apply stricter views of loss causation, with the most rigid – the “direct 
causation” approach – followed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits.262  The 
Seventh Circuit utilizes a somewhat less restrictive approach, focused on the 
“materialization of the [undisclosed] risk.”263
But the largest number of analyst bias cases will be decided by the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which has adopted what has been called a “flexible” approach to loss 
causation, analyzing the element from the perspective of foreseeability.264 This analysis is 
more akin to the tort concept of proximate cause, and Second Circuit loss causation cases 
occasionally even cite the seminal case of Palsgraf v. L.I.R.R., Co.,265 for the proposition 
that a determination of loss causation is, in the end, one of public policy, requiring 
conformity with a “rough sense of justice.”266
The Second Circuit’s seminal 10(b) loss causation case for our consideration was 
one involving fraud in connection with stock recommendations by a non-analyst.  The 
261 See, e.g., Gebhart v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2003); In re Control Data Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 933 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1991); Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003); Provenz v. 
Miller, 102 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1996).  On June 29, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal 
of the Broudo decision.  Mark H. Anderson, High Court to Review Standard Required to Sue over Stock 
Losses, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2004, at A6. 
262 See generally David S. Escoffery, Note, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule 10b-5 in 
Light of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1781 
(April 2000).
263 See, e.g., Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp., 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1990).  It is worth mentioning that a 
panel of the Second Circuit apparently prefers the Seventh Circuit’s approach to loss causation, writing in a 
footnote that were it “unconstrained by [its] own precedents, [it] might propose a different standard” noting 
that the materialization of the risk approach utilized in Bastian appears to be “both principled and 
predictable.”  Suez Equity Investors, 250 F.3d at 98, n.1.
264
“[L]loss causation . . . examines how directly . . . [the fraudulent conduct] caused the loss, and whether 
the resulting loss was a foreseeable outcome of the fraudulent [conduct].”  Suez Equity Investors, 250 F.3d 
at 96 (summarizing the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's definition of loss causation); see also
Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489, 1495 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that the securities fraud element 
of loss causation requires plaintiffs to prove “that the damage suffered was a foreseeable consequence of 
the misrepresentation.”).
265 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
266 Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).  See Suez Equity Investors v. Toronto Dominion Bank,  250 F.3d 
87, 96 (2d Cir. 2001); AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst and Young, 206 F.3d 202, 210 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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case of Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn267 well illustrates the foreseeability test for 
loss causation.  Kohn, a trainee employed by a broker-dealer, misrepresented himself as a 
“lawfully licensed registered representative,”268 recommended, and sold securities to the 
plaintiff.269  Plaintiff purchaser alleged that it became concerned about the performance 
of the stock, but was persuaded by the trainee to continue to hold the stocks, until such 
time as the fraud was revealed and the stocks were sold at a loss.270  The trial court found 
that Kohn’s misrepresentation induced not only the sale but also the plaintiff’s 
subsequent retention of the securities, which affected the extent of the loss.271  Even 
though Kohn’s fraud was not the cause of the decline in the stock’s price, the court found 
loss causation to have been established because the plaintiff’s injury was a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the fraud.272
In the more typical investor class action involving a drop in stock prices, the 
plaintiff surmounts the loss causation hurdle at the pleading stage by tying a material 
price decline in the security to a “corrective disclosure” or subsequent public statement 
by the issuer correcting a prior alleged misstatement or omission.273  The Marbury court 
expressly recognized that its facts did not follow the traditional pattern for assessment of 
the cause of injury in securities fraud cases.  However it felt strongly that “plaintiffs in a 
267
 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980).
268
 Kohn also represented himself to plaintiffs as a “broker,” a “portfolio management specialist,” and a 
“security analyst.”  Id. at 707.
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. at 708.
272 Id. at 709. (affirming trial court’s judgment against Kohn).
273
 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has described “the usual securities action” as follows:  
plaintiffs complain because some announcement emanating from the company, whether regarding 
a tender offer, … earnings, … projected earnings, … or the company's financial condition, … 
fraudulently represented the actual state of affairs. Plaintiffs claim that, as a result, they purchased 
the securities at a price that was artificially inflated, only to suffer a loss when the true situation 
was made known.”  
E.P. Medsystems v. Echocath, 235 F.3d 865, 884 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
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case such as this, whether or not their claims fall under the more familiar rubric, are, 
nevertheless, entitled to recover the damages that they suffered as a proximate result of 
the allegedly misleading statements.”274  Thus given the somewhat unique fact pattern –
involving the fraud’s inducement of both the sale and subsequent retention of the 
securities, during which period they lost value – the court could permit both transaction 
causation and loss causation to be established with the same basic allegations,275 noting 
that
differentiating transaction causation from loss causation can be a helpful 
analytical procedure only so long as it does not become a new rule effectively 
limiting recovery for fraudulently induced securities transactions to instances of 
fraudulent representations about the value characteristics of the securities dealt in.  
So concise a theory of liability for fraud would be too accommodative of many 
common types of fraud, such as the misrepresentation of a collateral fact that 
induces a transaction.276
Bolstering its ruling, the court analogized to three cases pre-dating the ’33 and ’34 
Acts, noting that liability for representations having the same effect as Kohn’s was 
“familiar in the law even before the [federal securities statutes] were enacted.”277
274 Id. at 708, (citing Globus Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 
913 (1970))
275 Id.  at 710.  See also Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974) (reversing 
dismissal and finding both loss causation and transaction causation to have been adequately alleged by 
statement that defendant’s misrepresentations manipulated the price at which plaintiff was forced to 
exchange his shares as a result of a merger, and he sustained injury thereby.)  
276 Id. at 710 n.3.
277 Id. at 709, analogizing to Rothmiller v. Stein, 38 N.E. 718 (N.Y. App. 1894); David v. Belmont, 197 
N.E. 83 (Mass. 1935); Cartwright v. Hughes, 147 So. 399 (1933); Continental Ins. Co. v. Mercadante, 225 
N.Y.S. 488 (N.Y. App. 1927).  On that same point, the court quoted Hotaling v. A.B. Leach & Co., 159 
N.E. 870 (N.Y. App. 1928), as follows:  “As long as the fraud continued to operate and to induce the 
continued holding of the bond, all loss flowing naturally from that fraud may be regarded as its proximate 
result.”
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In fact, as it turns out, Second Circuit loss causation precedents tend not to have 
arisen in cases conforming to the more familiar rubric.  Instead the facts presented by 
many of the court’s pronouncements on the subject have involved face-to-face 
misrepresentations, usually impacting the risk undertaken by the investing company.   
Naturally, the results have been highly fact dependant.  In a number of the more recent 
opinions the court has found loss causation allegations to have been adequately pled 
and/or proven based on the foreseeability of the alleged harm.278  The opposite is also 
true, particularly where an intervening cause can be established.279
Also serving as background to the analysis at hand are a number of specific 
foreseeability formulations have that surfaced in the Second Circuit in the 10(b) context.  
For example writing for the Court, Judge Oakes in AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & 
Young280 held that the appropriate test for loss causation is whether “there was a 
reasonable probability that the fraud actually accomplished the result it was intended to 
bring about.”281  Judge Oakes remanded the suit to the trial court, with Judge Jacobs 
278
 Castellano, 257 F.3d at 190 (finding summary judgment to have been improperly granted based on 
failure to adequately allege loss causation); Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 250 
F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2001) (; AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000) (vacating 
district court’s finding that loss causation had not been adequately proven and remanding for further fact 
finding as to foreseeability); Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(approving of jury instruction that loss causation was proven where “the damage was either a direct result 
of the misleading statement or one which could reasonably have been foreseen,”  in case involving 
misrepresentation of “investment quality” of repurchase transactions in government securities).
279
 The court itself describes some of these cases as follows, distinguishing them from its analysis in 
Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc.:
See Powers, 57 F.3d at 189 (market value of stock fell as a result of recession); Gelt Funding, 27 
F.3d at 772 (investor's loss caused by marketwide real estate crash); Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 
968 F.2d 1489, 1495 (2d Cir. 1992) (loss to plaintiff from loans made on the basis of fraudulent 
misrepresentation were the result of a decline in value of collateral unrelated to the fraud); Bloor 
v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1985) (loss caused not by 
misrepresentations in various documents used to attract investments but by looting and 
mismanagement of these funds by controlling stockholders).
257 F.3d 171, 189-190 (2d. Cir 2001).  Regarding the intervening cause defense, see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A at 107 (1977).
280
 206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000).
281 Id. at 212, quoting Continental Ins. Co. v. Mercadante, 225 N.Y.S. 488, 494 (N.Y. App. 1927).
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concurring in that result but not with the loss causation analysis; then-chief Judge 
Winters dissented as to the remand, feeling more strongly than Judge Oakes that loss 
causation had already been proven as a matter of law.282  A panel of the Second Circuit 
discussing AUSA’s procedurally fractured opinions in a later case found that Judge 
Winter’s views gave “valuable content” to Judge Oakes’s reasonable probability test.283
In his opinion, Judge Winter had urged that loss causation requires:
… consideration of the significance to a reasonable investor of the truth compared 
to the content of the misrepresentations or omissions. If the significance of the 
truth is such as to cause a reasonable investor to consider seriously a zone of risk 
that would be perceived as remote or highly unlikely by one believing the fraud, 
and the loss ultimately suffered is within that zone, then a misrepresentation or 
omission as to that information may be deemed a foreseeable or proximate cause 
of the loss.284
Certainly under the basic foreseeability analysis required in the Second Circuit, a 
plausible inference can be drawn in the analyst bias cases that either (1) the fraud 
accomplished its purpose, in that investors continued to buy the stock notwithstanding the 
underlying valuation of the investment quality was not there, a fact analysts knew but that 
was not discovered until later, or (2) the analysts themselves were in the best position to 
foresee the collapse of the market for the investments they were touting, given their status 
as professionals and specialists in the given industry, with far more of a bird’s eye view 
of the sector as a whole over time as well as superior more detailed intelligence as to the 
meaning of various events and occurrences therein and with regard to individual issuers, 
282 Id. at 224-228 (Jacobs, J., concurring) and 228-239 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
283
 Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 188 (2d Cir. 2001).
284 206 F.3d at 235.
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or (3) at the very least that the market collapse following discovery of systematic 
overvaluation – including the massive loss in value of the stocks in which plaintiffs 
invested – was within the “zone of risk” that investor plaintiffs would not have 
appreciated, but analysts did.285
Despite ample and recent authority sanctioning it, this simple foreseeability 
rationale may not win the day in the analyst bias cases.  More currently, in its 2001 
decision in Suez Equity Investors v. Toronto Dominion Bank,286 the Court expressly 
attempted to reconcile the Circuit’s different strands of reasoning on loss causation.287
There, the defendants had pitched an investment in a healthcare financing venture called 
SAM Group by redacting certain negative information – about SAM Group’s principal, 
Mallick, and past business and financial difficulties he had had – from a due diligence 
background report on Mallick requested by the plaintiffs.  Soon after plaintiffs invested, 
SAM Group collapsed in a liquidity crisis.  In their complaint, they alleged that it was 
Mallick’s mismanagement that caused SAM’s demise.  The court found that loss 
causation had been adequately pleaded, reversing the district court’s dismissal, because 
the omitted negative information could have made foreseeable Mallick’s failure 
285
 No doubt a number of defendants in the analyst bias cases will argue that an intervening event – the so-
called “bursting of the bubble” or overall collapse of the Internet/technology/communications investment 
sector – was the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ losses, and so loss causation was not properly pled or cannot 
be established as a matter of law.  See notes * - * and accompanying text.  The Second Circuit was 
persuaded of this in a RICO case, First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp. 27 F.3d 763, 769-70 (2d 
Cir. 1994).  The Court of Appeals there approved the use of a three-part test for determining proximate 
cause where a borrower is alleged to have misrepresented the value of collateral or its income, in 
connection with a non-recourse real estate purchase money loan.  These are (1) the magnitude of the 
misrepresentation in value of the property, (2) the time elapsing between the misrepresentation and the loss, 
and (3) the effect of external factors.  In that case, where the magnitude of misrepresentation was unclear, 
the losses occurred five years after the purported misrepresentations, and a general real estate market 
decline had occurred in the relevant area, loss causation was not adequately pleaded.  The court, however, 
went out of its way to say “We do not mean to suggest that in all cases a fraud plaintiff will be unable to 
plead proximate cause when the claim follows a market collapse. In this case, it is the cumulative effect of 
the considerations discussed above, rather than any single factor, that compels our decision.” Id. at 772.
286
 250 F.3d at 87.
287 Id. at 98, n.1.
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effectively to manage SAM.  Relying heavily on the distinction between Marbury 
Management, and Bennett v. U.S. Trust Co.,288 the rule as stated in Suez Equity was 
“plaintiffs may allege transaction and loss causation by averring both that they would not 
have entered the transaction but for the misrepresentations and that the defendants’ 
misrepresentations induced a disparity between the transaction price and the true 
‘investment quality’ of the securities at the time of transaction.”289
The Second Circuit’s most recent loss causation opinion is Emergent Investment 
Capital Management, LLP v.  Stonepath Group, Inc.,290 which purports to clarify the Suez 
Equity rule.  The suit arose out of defendants’ failure to disclose a relationship between 
the issuer and one Howard Appel, who was alleged to be the mastermind behind 
numerous similar “pump and dump” schemes.291  In addition to this omission, plaintiffs 
also alleged that defendants artificially inflated the stock’s price, that defendants were in 
a position to “manipulate [relevant] stock prices,” and that they had made “substantial” 
sales of the relevant stock during the relevant period.292  The court found that under a 
liberal reading of the complaint, the stock the plaintiffs purchased could be viewed as one 
288 770 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1985).  The Bennetts allegedly were told that federal margin rules did not apply to 
public utility stock deposited with a bank as collateral, enabling them to purchase more than $1 million 
dollars worth of such stocks on margin in an “undermargined” account.  Eventually the dividends paid by 
the stocks were insufficient to cover the interest expense on the loans and when the investments also 
declined in value, the bank sold the stocks and the resulting deficiency was nonetheless more than $1 
million.  The Suez Equity court said the following about Marbury and Bennett:
Because the misrepresentation in Marbury Management induced the purchase (transaction loss) 
and related to the stock's value (loss causation), it was causally related to the loss. In Bennett since 
the margin rules [the subject of defendant’s alleged misrepresentation] were extrinsic to the stock, 
the complaint failed to allege loss causation.  
Id. at 97.
289 Id. at 97-98.
290 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003).
291
 The court describes a pump and dump scheme one “where the company principals artificially inflated 
[the] stock prices before ‘dumping’ their own shares … on the market,” Id. at 197, citing 3 THOMAS LEE 
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.18 (4th ed. 2002).
292 Id. at 197-98.  
71
of the defendants’ pump and dump schemes, and that loss causation was adequately 
pleaded by virtue of the pump and dump allegations.293
After so holding the court explained in a separate section of the opinion that it had
not in Suez Equity intended to establish a rule that allegations of artificial price inflation 
caused by the defendants standing alone were enough to satisfactorily plead loss 
causation.294  Instead, the court explained in Emergent Capital, a “second, related loss” in 
addition to the “purchase-time value disparity” had actually been alleged in Suez 
Equity.295  According to the court, that second related loss was Mallick’s “concealed lack 
of managerial ability induced [the company’s] failure.”296  Though not expressed as such, 
apparently the second, related loss in Emergent Capital was the defendants’ manipulation 
of the stock prices and subsequent substantial sales of the artificially inflated stock.  
Not reconciled in the Emergent Capital case is the Circuit’s well entrenched 
holding in Marbury Management.297  Arguably, a second, related loss alleged in Marbury 
Management was the fact that the plaintiff was convinced by the trainee (based on his 
continuing fraudulent representations as to his qualifications as a stock analyst and 
investment specialist) to hold the recommended stocks beyond when it had misgivings 
about them.  The Suez Equity court had identified the causal link in Marbury as the fact 
the trainee’s advice and recommendations were related to the stock’s “investment 
293
 343 F.3d at 198.
294 Id.  Plaintiffs had alleged an independent basis for establishing loss causation, namely that defendants’ 
omissions “induced a disparity between the price plaintiff paid for the …shares and their true investment 
quality.”  Id., citing plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint at paragraph 79(ii).
295
 343 F.3d at 198.
296 Id.  
297
 The vitality of that holding did not appear to be in doubt up to the point Emergent Capital was decided.  
Suez Equity relied in great part on it, as had other Second Circuit opinions preceding it.  See, e.g., 
Castellano, 257 F.3d at 187; AUSA, 206 F.3d at 211; Mftrs. Hanover Trust, 801 F.2d at 21-22.  Moreover,
as recently as 2002, in an unpublished opinion following the remand of the AUSA case, supra, a different 
panel of the Second Circuit expressly reaffirmed Marbury’s rationale, while recognizing that its holding 
was inapplicable to the case there at hand.  AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 39 Fed. Appx. 667, 673 
(2d Cir. 2002).
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quality.”298  Reading Suez Equity and Emergent Capital together, it appears that an initial 
fraud inducing the plaintiff’s purchase at an artificially high price must be coupled with a 
second related loss, which can be an inducement to continue to hold the stock by a 
continuing misrepresentation or omission that relates to the investment quality of the 
stock.  
Confounding the opacity of the Second Circuit’s loss causation jurisprudence, is 
Rothman v Gregor,299 a case that was pending and argued quite contemporaneously with 
Suez Equity but by a different panel of the Second Circuit, and which is still good law.300
That 10(b) case involved misrepresentations by the issuer with regard to its capitalization, 
versus expensing, of royalty advances.  The complaint alleged that the losses plaintiffs 
sustained during the class period were attributable not to the misrepresented accounting 
policy itself, but due to the market’s reaction to knowledge of an imminent massive write 
down required by adjustment of the faulty accounting practice.301  According to the court, 
these allegations did permit the required loss causation showing to be made, with the 
question for the jury to be whether the issuer “could reasonably foresee that its fraudulent 
failure to expense would lead to a drop in GT's stock price whenever the market became 
aware of the impending writedown” because its reported earnings during the class period 
298
 Suez Equity, 250 F.3d at 97.
299
 220 F.3d 81, 95-96 (2d Cir. 2000).    
300
 Rothman was argued in June 2000 and decided in July 2000 by a panel consisting of Justices Oakes, 
Newman & Straub.  Suez Equity was argued in May 2000, and ultimately decided in May 2001 by a panel 
consisting of Chief Justice Cardamone, and Justices Miner, and Walker.  While the Suez Equity opinion, 
authored by Justice Cardamone (as was Emergent Capital a year later) purports to attempt to harmonize 
loss causation precedent within the circuit, it makes no reference whatever to the Rothman opinion, which 
is completely consistent with Judge Oakes’s previous opinions in AUSA and .
301
 Coincidentally, and with no indication that there was any analyst bias involved (perhaps to the contrary), 
plaintiffs contended that the market reaction was precipitated in part by a research analyst’s reporting on 
the possible write-off and downgrading of the stock.  Id. at 87, 95.
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may well have been losses.302  A straight forseeability analysis, then appears to still be 
preferred at least by some members of the Second Circuit.  Perhaps more importantly, the 
Rothman fact pattern is somewhat analogous to the analyst bias fact pattern, in the sense 
that the bubble burst at or near the time the market became generally aware of analysts’ 
conflicts and general lack of candor with regard to so many Internet and other “hot” 
sector stocks.
Reading the Rothman, Suez Equity, and Emergent Capital opinions consistently 
would appear to permit the required finding of loss causation in analyst bias cases at least 
at the pleading stage.  It is certainly arguable that analysts not only knew they were 
pumping up the bubble as they pumped up stock prices, but it was then also foreseeable 
to analysts that when their secret opinions and/or the systemic bias was discovered, the 
market’s reaction would have a negative impact on prices, correcting stocks to nearer 
their true values and causing losses to those who bought at artificially high prices and 
held the stocks through their decline.  While one district court judge has steadfastly 
refused to find loss causation to be present in analyst bias cases before him, the majority 
considering this issue in analyst bias cases to date has agreed with this result.  The 
following subsection details a number of the illustrative rulings on this issue so far.
(b) Pending Analyst Bias Cases
The cases decided thus far in the district courts have come down both ways on 
loss causation, weighted by number in favor of permitting the issue of loss causation to 
proceed to a jury.  For example, in DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens,303 Judge Lynch of 
the Southern District of New York ruled that loss causation had been adequately pleaded, 
302 Id. at 95-96.
303 No. 03 Civ. 590 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2004).
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taking the practical view that it was for the jury to assess the plaintiffs’ theory of the case, 
which is that the analysts’ misrepresentations inflated the bubble, which then foreseeably 
burst.304  According to Judge Lynch, the artificial price inflation created by the 
defendants’ misrepresented opinions, which is itself not sufficient to adequately allege 
loss causation under Emergent Capital, certainly contained the “seeds” of loss causation, 
given the inevitability of a market correction.305
Similarly, in DeMarco v. Lehman Bros.,306 Judge Rakoff of the Southern District 
took the position that loss causation was adequately pleaded by virtue of allegations that 
the plaintiffs’ losses resulted from the “marketplace’s reaction to the revelation of the 
truth that defendant’s actionable statements concealed (as contrasted to independent 
market forces).” 307  The issue as framed in that case is more like the “familiar rubric” 
securities fraud cases, in which a corrective statement apprised the market of the 
concealed information that had led the analyst to harbor his secretly negative view.  
These allegations, according to Judge Rakoff, suffice for loss causation “under any 
standard.”308
304 Id. at *32-33.
305 Id. at *32.
306
 309 F.Supp.2d 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
307 Id. at 636.  The evidence was to the contrary in Robbins v. Koger, 116 F.3d 1441, 1448-1449 (11th Cir. 
1997) (reversing jury’s finding of loss causation).
308 Id.  Judge Denise Cote of the Southern District has also held on a motion to dismiss that loss causation 
was adequately pleaded against the analyst and broker-dealer in In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 
F.Supp. 2d 392, 428-429 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  She reasoned that “given Grubman’s historical role in creating 
demand for WorldCom securities, when the alleged illicit relationship came to light, the disclosure 
contributed to the decline in price of WorldCom’s securities.”  Id. at 429.  Judge Cote also found in the case 
before her a “striking resemblance” to Marbury Management:  “plaintiffs have alleged that the material 
omissions concerned the integrity and reliability of the premier analyst for the telecommunications 
industry.  As was true in Marbury Management, these alleged omissions are sufficiently related to the value 
of the stock recommended by Grubman to satisfy the requirements for pleading loss causation.”  Id.
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The trial court also has ruled favorably to plaintiffs on this issue in a case 
captioned  Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros .309  There Judge Scheindlin read Emergent Capital
somewhat more literally as requiring “something more” than artificial price inflation 
caused by the defendants’ misprepresentations.310  According to Judge Scheindlin, the 
“something more” in both the Suez Equity and Emergent Capital cases was that the 
“ultimate decline in the companies’ stock price was attributable to the very thing that the 
defendants allegedly lied about.”311  By analogy, in the case before her, the securities 
issuer “ultimately failed because of the very facts that the [defendants] misrepresented: 
that [the relevant stock issuer] was in financial trouble and that the entire ‘internet 
telephony sector’ was collapsing.”312  She also analogized the analysts’ disingenuous 
opinions to the redacted background report in Suez Equity:  the analysts obscured the true 
facts about the investment quality of the stock by injecting their “purportedly expert” 
opinions into the marketplace to obscure the logical conclusion to be drawn from 
objective facts about the issuer, i.e. that it was failing.313  Thus, she concludes that loss 
causation was adequately pleaded: 
In sum, the [defendants], knowing that [the issuer]was actually in decline, inflated 
the price of [its] shares and then worked doubly hard to conceal or obfuscate the 
309 03 Civ. 5194 (SAS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9193 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2004). See also Judge 
Scheindlin’s loss causation opinion denying defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings in an 
analogous market manipulation suit against numerous underwriter/broker dealers,  In re IPO Sec. Litig., 
297 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
310
 Fogarazzo, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9193 at *33.  Judge Scheindlin concludes that the “something more” 
that must be pleaded need not constitute an independent cause of the plaintiffs’ losses.  Id.  
311 Id. at *39.
312 Id. at *41.
313 Id. at *42-43. 
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meaning of every fact that would have revealed that decline to the investing 
public. How could the [defendants] not have foreseen the loss to investors?314
On the other hand, Sr. District Judge Pollack has rejected plaintiffs’ attempts to 
plead loss causation in the consolidated class action suits against Merrill Lynch.  
Specifically, in several related opinions, Judge Pollack has views the analyst bias cases as 
essentially involving investors’ assumption of the risk.315   In his view, the plaintiffs in 
the cases before him have either failed to plead more than simple artificial price 
inflation,316 which Emergent Capital teaches is not enough, and/or that the bursting of the 
stock market bubble is an intervening event that breaks any chain of proximate cause that 
would exist.317   He makes much of the fact that the analyst bias cases involve not face-
to-face misrepresentations, but instead depend on the fraud-on-the-market presumption to 
314 Id. at *49-50.
315
 Judge Pollack’s apparent predisposition is to hold individual investors accountable for their own losses 
arising out of the recent bubble market.  For example, in the 24/7 Real Media decision, he describes the 
plaintiffs as 
among the high risk speculators who, knowing full well or being properly chargeable with 
appreciation of the unjustifiable risks they were undertaking in the extremely volatile and highly 
untested stocks at issue, now hope to twist the federal securities laws into a scheme of cost-free 
speculators’ insurance.
In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d at 358.  He further elaborates:
Seeking to lay the blame for the enormous Internet Bubble solely at the feet of a single actor, …, 
plaintiffs would have this Court conclude that the federal securities laws were meant to 
underwrite, subsidize, and encourage their rash speculation in joining a freewheeling casino that 
lured thousands of obsessed with the fantasy of Olympian riches, but which delivered such riches 
to only a scant handful of lucky winners. … Had the plaintiffs themselves won the game instead of 
losing, they would have owed not a single penny of their winnings to those they left to hold the 
bag (or to defendants).
Id.  And in yet another place, he says “…plaintiffs brought their own losses upon themselves when they 
knowingly spun an extremely high-risk, high-stakes wheel of fortune.”  Id.  More succinctly in an earlier 
group of cases, Judge Pollack had described other 10(b) plaintiffs simply as “gamblers in the world’s 
gaming pits,” summarily dismissing their six related suits sua sponte.  See, e.g., Thomson v. Morgan 
Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., No. 01 CIV 7071 (MP), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12667 (S.D.N.Y. August 21, 
2001).
316 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp.2d 351, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing 24/7 Real Media and 
Interliant complaints); In re Merrill Lynch Tyco Research Reports Sec. Litig., No. 03 CV 4080 (MP), 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2247, *4-10 (S.D.N.Y. February 18, 2004) (dismissing Tyco complaint).
317 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 364-365; In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports 
Sec. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 416, 421-422 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing eToys, Homestore.com, iVillage, 
Lifeminders, LookSmart, Openwave Systems, Pets.com, and Quokka Sports complaints).
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establish transaction causation.  Thus, he distinguishes seemingly analogous Second 
Circuit case law, i.e. Marbury Management, in favor of heavy reliance on the Second 
Circuit’s primary “intervening cause” opinion, First Nationwide Bank v Gelt Funding 
Corp.,318 and those of other circuits.319
The Second Circuit has yet to weigh in on the subject of loss causation in a case 
involving the analyst bias fact pattern.  The only Circuit Court of Appeals to address the 
issue in this context is the Eleventh,320 in LaGrasta v. First Union National Bank.321 in 
LaGrasta, failure to adequately plead loss causation was argued by defendants but was 
not addressed by the trial court, as it disposed of the case on statute of limitations 
grounds.  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the statute of limitations ruling and
remanded for consideration of defendant’s loss causation arguments.  In dicta the opinion 
suggested the district court consider the effect the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act generally may have had on the Circuit’s loss causation precedent, and also whether 
that statute’s codification of the element altered the traditional notice pleading 
standards.322  This limited discussion does not appear to provide any further guidance on 
the topic.
Section VII – Damages
318
 27 F.3d763 (2d Cir. 1994).  The intervening cause alleged in Gelt was the collapse of the real estate 
market five years after defendants made misrepresentations, inter alia, about the quality of their rent rolls.  
The Gelt court found that the intervening general decline in market prices substantially caused the 
collateral’s reduction in value, and hence plaintiff’s losses.  Id. at 772.
319 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, 289 F. Supp.2d at 422, citing Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp., 892 F.2d 680 
(7th Cir. 1990) and Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir 1988).
320
 Interestingly, it has been noted that the Eleventh Circuit is one of the most defense-friendly circuits in 
the nation when it comes to dismissal of securities fraud cases.  Steve Ellman, Fixed Fight? MIAMI DAILY 
BUS. REV. (May 14, 2004).
321
 358 F.3d 840 (11th Cir. 2004).
322 Id. at 851 (citing inter alia Gebhardt v. Conagra Foods, Inc.,335 F.3d 824, 830 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003), not 
an analyst case, for the proposition that it does not).
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Of course, there is a distinction between the loss causation requirement and proof 
of damages. To satisfy the element of loss causation, a plaintiff need not show that a 
misrepresentation or omission was the sole cause of the investment’s decline in value. 
Ultimately, however, the plaintiff will be allowed to recover only those damages actually 
caused by the misrepresentation.  Neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 specifies an 
appropriate measure of damages.  Thus at least one observer has noted that “the question 
of damages under Rule 10b-5 is extremely open-ended.”323  A more cynical court 
concluded that it is a “confused area of the law where the courts, forced to rely on their 
own wits, have created a myriad of approaches.”324
Damages in a 10(b) case are delimited by Sections 28(a) of the Exchange Act,325
and 21D(e) of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.326  The latter is discussed 
further on in this section; the former provides, in pertinent part:  “No person permitted to 
maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this title shall recover, through 
satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual 
damages on account of the act complained of.”   
Given the broad nature of this statutory prescription, and in light of the two 
Supreme Court cases ruling on damages in securities fraud cases, the rule for damages 
under 10(b) is quite flexible and inclusive.  In Affiliated Ute, the Court ruled that the 
323 J. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 810 (1991); see also LOUIS LOSS & 
JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1060 (3d ed. 1995) (“Section  10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 specify no damage or rescission standards, prompting the courts to take an ad hoc approach 
that often uses the common law out-of-pocket measure as an initial reference point and allows appellate 
courts to exercise the discretion traditionally left to the trial courts in finding damages appropriate to the 
facts of the case.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
324
 Lewis D. Lowenfels and Alan R. Bromberg, Compensatory Damages in Rule 10b-5 Actions:  Pragmatic 
Justice or Chaos?, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 1083, 1084 and 1113 (2000), quoting Koch v. Koch Indus., 
Inc., 6 F. Supp.2d 1192, 1201 (D. Kan 1998).  
325
 15 U.S.C. §78bb(a).  The U.S. Supreme Court has assumed that Section 28(a) applies to 10(b) cases.  
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972).
326
 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(e).  
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measure of a defrauded seller’s damages could include both out-of-pocket damages and 
“windfall” or disgorgement damages, applicable for example where the purchaser resells 
the plaintiff’s shares at a profit: 
In our view, the correct measure of damages under §28 of the [Exchange] Act, …,  
is the difference between the fair value of all that the … seller received and the 
fair value of what he would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct, 
… except for the situation where the defendant received more than the seller’s 
actual loss.  In the latter case, the damages are the amount of the defendant’s 
profit.327
Subsequently, in Randall v. B.J. Loftsgaarden, 328 the Court permitted a rescissory 
measure of damages for a defrauded buyer, not limited to the “net economic harm” 
suffered.329  Lower courts have found out-of-pocket, windfall, rescissory, benefit-of-the-
bargain, and disgorgement/unjust enrichment/constructive trust, consequential damages, 
and yet other measures appropriate in various 10(b) scenarios.330
Nonetheless, the measure of damages in a typical 10b case is out-of-pocket 
losses,331 or the difference between the price paid and the value actually received.  The 
327
 Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155, citing Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 748 (8th Cir. 1967) and Janigan v. 
Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965).
328
 478 U.S. 647 (1986).
329 Id. at  663.   
330 See, e.g., Lowenfels and Bromberg, supra note n- .  For a more thorough discussion of damages in 
securities fraud cases, see generally Andrew L. Merritt, A Consistent Model of Loss Causation in Securities 
Fraud Litigation:  Suiting the Remedy to the Wrong, 66 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985); Robert B. 
Thompson, The Measure of Recovery under Rule 10b-5:  A Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 
VAND. L. REV. 349 (1984).
331
 Randall, 478 U.S. at 661-62; id. at 668 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Normally . . . the proper  measure 
of damages  in a §10(b) case is an investor’s out-of-pocket loss . . . .”); see also Lawton v. Nyman, 327 
F.3d 30, 42-43 (1st Cir. 2003); Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 260 F.3d 239, 250 (3rd Cir. 2001); 
DCD Programs Ltd. v. Leighton, 90 F.3d 1442, 1446-1447 (9th Cir. 1995); Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079, 
1092 (6th Cir. 1993); Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc., 813 F.2d 296, 301 (10th Cir. 1987); Huddleston 
v. Herman & McLean, 640 F.2d 534, 556 (5th Cir. 1981).
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difficulty is in proving the value of what was received, and in removing from plaintiffs’ 
recovery other losses associated with general market effects unrelated to the fraud.332
The precise calculations in a given case are typically the province of expert testimony.333
How a given plaintiff fares will also depend on how the burden of proof is allocated on 
this issue.334
Many courts have been inclined to permit the stock’s value after a corrective 
disclosure to stand in for its value as of the date of the initial transaction.  The measure of 
plaintiffs’ damages then can be called the “expedient” out of pocket measure, avoiding 
the vagaries of proof of what the stock was theoretically worth on the date of the 
plaintiff’s transaction.335  This shifts to defendants the burden of paying for any non-fraud 
driven changes in market value.336
Particularly concerned with the overcompensation that initial selling “panic” 
created in typical damage calculations, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
attempted to place a limit on the damages recovered in 10(b) actions, focused on 
332
 One article proposes a mathematical formula to accomplish this.  Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, 
Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages:  A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 23 
(1994) (arguing that failure to remove overreaction from damage figures ends up substantially 
overestimating plaintiffs’ damages).
333 See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 234 (3rd Cir. 2001) (discussing expert witness 
calculation of damages in 10(b) suit); Robbins v. Koger, 116 F.3d 1441, 1445-1446 (11th Cir. 1997) (same).
334
 Robert B. Thompson, “Simplicity and Certainty” in the Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5, 61 
BUS. LAW. 1177, (August 1996) (noting that in some measures of recovery the “plaintiff bears the burden 
of uncertainty of how much of the change is fraud related and how much is market related and in others the 
risk of this uncertainty is borne by defendants,” citing Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir 1962)).
335 WILLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC. I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 4.8.2.2 (1996) (distinguishing 
“expedient” out-of-pocket measure from true out-of-pocket, which uses value of stock at time of plaintiff’s 
transaction).  See also cases cited ing Thompson, supra note n-1 at * n. 76.
336
 Professor Thompson argues in favor of the use of the expedient out-of-pocket measure, but where 
appropriate courts should reduce the plaintiffs’ recovery by “the amount that the defendant proves was due 
to changes in the market,” properly placing on the party who committed the fraud the uncertainty of market 
changes.  Thompson, supra note n-2 at * (near note 109) and * (near nn26-30) (discussing ways in which 
various damage measures operate to allocate the risk of non-fraud related decreases in value of the stock to 
defendants, and noting that use of the pure, unmodified out-of-pocket measure avoids this).
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preventing plaintiffs from taking advantage of market overcorrection following a 
corrective disclosure revealing fraud.337  The relevant provision provides, in toto:
(e) Limitation on damages.
(1) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any private action arising 
under this title [15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.] in which the plaintiff seeks to establish 
damages by reference to the market price of a security, the award of damages to 
the plaintiff shall not exceed the difference between the purchase or sale price 
paid or received, as appropriate, by the plaintiff for the subject security and the 
mean trading price of that security during the 90-day period beginning on the date 
on which the information correcting the misstatement or omission that is the basis 
for the action is disseminated to the market.
(2) Exception. In any private action arising under this title [15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et 
seq.] in which the plaintiff seeks to establish damages by reference to the market 
price of a security, if the plaintiff sells or repurchases the subject security prior to 
the expiration of the 90-day period described in paragraph (1), the plaintiff's 
damages shall not exceed the difference between the purchase or sale price paid 
or received, as appropriate, by the plaintiff for the security and the mean trading 
price of the security during the period beginning immediately after dissemination 
of information correcting the misstatement or omission and ending on the date on 
which the plaintiff sells or repurchases the security.
337
 Congress’s Conference Report on the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act describes the measure of 
damages in securities fraud cases as “complex and uncertain,” and assumes that the typical measure is “the 
difference between the price the investor paid for the security and the price of the security on the day the 
corrective information gets disseminated to the market” (i.e. the expedient out-of-pocket measure).  H.R. 
CONF. REP. No. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1995) reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 741.  It then 
discusses the need to reduce plaintiffs’ recovery by losses caused by an amount representing effects of 
other market conditions, by using a “look back” or rebound period to calculate a “mean trading price” if the 
plaintiff sells or repurchases the securities during the 90-day period following the corrective disclosure.  Id.
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(3) Definition. For purposes of this subsection, the “mean trading price” of a 
security shall be an average of the daily trading price of that security, determined 
as of the close of the market each day during the 90-day period referred to in 
paragraph (1).
Though referred to by Congress as a “measure” of damages,338 this provision does 
nothing more than create a potential cap,339 and in fact it does not mandate that other 
market effects be removed from plaintiffs’ recovery.  While arguably permitting 
defendants to benefit from any rebound in price the stock may experience after an initial 
crash or panic that follows corrective disclosure, it does little to clarify the measure of 
damages in 10(b) cases.340
None of the analyst bias cases has yet to reach the damages stage, but the measure 
likely to be used therein is out-of-pocket losses.  This is true notwithstanding that in a 
declining market plaintiffs would usually opt for rescissory damages,341 given that 
plaintiffs generally did not transact with the analyst and broker-dealer defendants,342 but 
338
 Conference Report, supra note * at 42, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 741.
339
 As Professor Thompson points out, the “cap” does not even accomplish its mission of excluding from 
plaintiff’s damages any panic effect when its provisions are applied in a declining market.  Id. at * page 
including notes99-100. 
340
 Thompson, supra note * at pages containing notes 89-96 (my copy from L-N is not star paginated) 
(illustrating by way of numerical examples how PSLRA’s cap confounds effort to remove market effects 
from fraudulently inflated stock price).
341
 Thompson, supra note * at text surrounding notes 26&27 (ditto re star pagination).
342
 Note that plaintiffs in the analyst bias cases are usually not clients of the broker-dealer defendant that 
employed the analyst defendant.  Investors who signed brokerage agreements with arbitration clauses are 
limited to seeking individual redress via industry-sponsored NASD arbitration proceedings, which may be 
less inclined to make large awards but which, on the other hand, are not as constrained by legal 
technicalities.  Barbara Black and Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along:  The Role of Law in 
Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1006-07 (2002); Skinner v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette 
Secs. Corp (In re Skinner), No. C 03-2625 VRW, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 24045 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2003) 
(denying motion to vacate arbitral award in favor of broker dealer in case alleging analyst bias).  See also
Susanne Craig and John Hechinger, Wall Street’s Dispute Process Under Fire From Regulators, WALL ST. 
J. (July 20, 2004), at C1 (describing, in part, arbitration process). However, class action arbitration is 
prohibited by NASD arbitration rules, therefore class action plaintiffs are required by SLUSA to proceed in 
federal court.   
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instead bought shares in the open market343 allegedly based on analysts’ public 
recommendations.  Depending on whether courts will use the true or the expedient out-
of-pocket measure, it appears that a battle of the experts ultimately will ensue to 
determine what portion of the reduction in value of the stock’s price.344  Thus, with 
damages the perennial “afterthought” of class action securities litigation, this element 
inevitably will serve as the final fierce frontline in any case that does not settle before 
trial. 345
Section VIII - Statute of Limitations
While each of the elements of the claim is critical to analysis of the overall merits 
of any analyst bias suit, no discussion of analyst and broker-dealer liability would not be 
complete without at least a brief discussion of the relevant statute of limitations and its 
effect on the cases.  
Claims brought under 10(b) have long carried a one year/three year statute of 
limitations:  suit must be brought within on year after discovery of the facts giving rise to 
the claim, and no more than three years after the securities transaction at issue.346 The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 extended the limitations period for federal securities fraud 
claims to the earlier of two years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation 
343 See Green v. Occidental Petroleum, 541 F.2d 1335, 1341 n1 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring, 
defining typical “open market” case as one in which defendants had no direct dealings with plaintiffs, and 
therefore obtained no direct pecuniary gain from plaintiff’s transaction).
344 See Lowenfels and Bromberg, supra note *.
345 See Thompson, supra note * at (text accompanying notes ~7,8) (explaining that litigants are often 
content to “leave the measure of recovery to be resolved another day” and that few courts, given the 
number of cases that settle early, have been forced to define the measure of damages).
346
 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e); see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 
364 n.9 (1991) (analogizing to express one year/three year statutes of limitations elsewhere in the 1933 
and 1934 Acts and holding that § 10(b) claims are subject to the limitations period set forth in § 9(e) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
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or five years after such a violation.347  Though the legislation clearly provides that it 
“shall apply to all proceedings addressed by this section that are commenced on or after 
the date of enactment of this Act [July 30, 2002],”348 and that “[n]othing in this section 
shall create a new, private right of action,”349 what is not clear is whether Sarbanes-
Oxley’s limitation period was meant to revive claims that may have already expired 
under the preexisting one year/three years statute.  
(a) Existing General Precedent 
In this regard, the Circuit Courts of Appeal have consistently held that applying 
the longer statute of limitations to revive previously time-barred claims is impermissible 
unless the legislature clearly expresses the intent to do so.350  Predictably, the district 
courts that have addressed the question relative to Sarbanes-Oxley’s new longer 
limitations period, in non-analyst cases, have come up with mixed results.  
In Roberts v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.,351 the district court found that Sarbanes-
Oxley revived already time-barred claims, reasoning that the legislative history 
demonstrated Congress’s intention to achieve that result.352  An interlocutory appeal on 
347 Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides:  
[A] private right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in 
contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws, as defined in section 
3(a)(47) of the [Exchange Act] [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(47)], may be brought not later than the earlier 
of --
(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or
(2) 5 years after such violation.
28 U.S.C. § 1658.
348
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 804(b), P.L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
349 Id. at § 804(c).
350 Million v. Frank, 47 F.3d 385, 390 (10th Cir. 1995); Kan. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Reimer & Koger 
Assocs., Inc., 61 F.3d 608, 615 (8th Cir. 1995); Chenault v. United States Postal Serv., 37 F.3d 535, 539 
(9th Cir. 1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Artley, 28 F.3d 1099, 1103 n.6 (11th Cir. 1994); FDIC v. Belli, 
981 F.2d 838, 842-43 (5th Cir. 1993). See also Stone v. Hamilton, 308 F.3d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 2002); In re 
Apex Exp. Corp., 190 F.3d 624, 642 (4th Cir. 1999).  The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Chenault was cited 
with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, ex rel. Schumer, 520 
U.S. 939 (1997).
351
 No. 8:02-cv-2115-T-26EAJ, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5676 (M.D. Fla., March 31, 2003).
352 Id. at **9-12.
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the question is currently pending before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.353   A 
similar result obtained in In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. and “ERISA” Litig.354 The 
court held that the longer Sarbanes-Oxley limitations period applies to cases filed after its 
date.355  There, the first class action complaint was filed on July 18, 2002 , two weeks 
before Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted, and a consolidated complaint filed on September 16, 
2002.  Therefore, although “in most cases, class actions or otherwise, the date of the 
first filing is the operative one for statute of limitations purposes,” the court deemed the 
later filing date of the consolidated complaint the operative date for purposes of 
limitation of this action.  The court’s rationale for permitting the case to proceed under 
the longer statutory period provided for by Sarbanes-Oxley was that any other result 
would be “both inequitable and impractical” in that it would unfairly punish the plaintiffs 
for filing too early and would lead to a mass opt-out from the class.356
Other district courts have issued opinions consistent with the presumption against 
retroactivity.  In the case of In re Enterprise Mortgage Acceptance Co., LLC Sec. 
Litig.,357 Judge Kram of the Southern District of New York held that “there is no clear 
language in the statute stating that it applies retroactively or that it operates to revive 
time-barred claims,” and that the Act disavowed creation of any new rights of action, 
expressly disagreeing with the Roberts court’s interpretation of the legislative intent.358
Similarly, in Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc.,359 a Virginia district court held that “Congress 
did not unambiguously provide that the [new] limitations period would apply 
353 Id. at **12-13.
354 MDL Docket No. 1500, 02 Civ. 5575 (SWK), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7917 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2004).
355 Id. at **27-28.
356 Id. at **25-26.  
357 295 F. Supp. 2d 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
358 Id. at 312.
359
 303 F. Supp. 2d 724 (E.D. Va. 2003).
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retroactively.”360  That coupled with the presumption against retroactivity led the court to 
dismiss the claims as time-barred.361  Other jurisdictions have agreed.362
(b) Pending Analyst Liability Cases
In one of the Worldcom-related cases, 363 Judge Cote found that “there is no 
explicit language in the statute” that would operate to revive time-barred claims.  She 
also felt that lengthening the statute of limitations this way “would affect the substantive 
rights of the defendants by depriving them of a defense on which they were entitled to 
rely.”  Accordingly, she held that “Sarbanes- Oxley does not revive previously time-
barred private securities fraud claims” and dismissed those claims in the case that had 
expired in June 2002 (a month before Sarbanes-Oxley was passed).364
The question of which limitations period to apply is not at issue in some of the 
analyst bias cases.365  Nonetheless, a relevant issue has been at what point in time
plaintiffs were on notice of their claims, so as to trigger the running of the relevant 
limitations period.  Circuit Courts generally have applied some version of the 
constructive or inquiry notice doctrine in 10b cases, such that the statute begins to run 
360 Id. at 734.
361 Id.
362 See In re Heritage Bond Litigation, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2003).  There, plaintiffs first 
asserted their Section 20(a) claims based on statements made more than three years earlier in a complaint 
filed on July 24, 2002, just days before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.  They then filed another complaint 
asserting the same claims on August 30, 2002.  The court held that “while the amended statute of 
limitations may apply to proceedings filed after passage of the Act, it cannot apply to claims already barred 
at the time of its enactment, regardless of the filing date.”  See also Lieberman v. Cambridge Partners, 
L.L.C., No. Civ. A. 03-2317, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11553, at *3 and n.12 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2004); In re 
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & Erisa Litig., No. MDL-1446, Civ.A. H-01-3624, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8158, at *17 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2004).
363 In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig. (re TARGETS), Nos. 02 Civ. 3288 and 03 Civ. 9490 (DLC), 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 11696 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2004). 
364 Id. at **23-24.  In a different proceeding related to Worldcom, Judge Cote also found that the new 
longer limitations period of Sarbanes-Oxley did not apply to Section 11 and Section 12(a) claims brought 
under the Securities Act of 1933.  In re WorldCom (re State of Alasaka Dept. of Rev.), 294 F. Supp. 431, 
440-441 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
365 See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 02 Civ. 6912 (HB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11120 
(S.D.N.Y., June  30, 2003) (applying one year/three year statute to suit filed in August 2002 without 
discussion).
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when the plaintiff has actual knowledge of the facts giving rise to his claims or has 
notice of facts that in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have led to such 
knowledge.366
In this regard, plaintiffs appear to have been in something of a bind – pointing to 
in-depth journalists’ accounts of analyst bias in support of their claims, but stuck with 
the fact that some of that media coverage well predated the filing of their complaints, 
and pointing to analysts’ steadfast refusal to downgrade despite plummeting share prices 
as early as 2000 as facts supporting falsity and scienter, but not having filed their suits 
until well after that.  The district courts have come down both ways, some holding that a 
steep decline in share price or popular press coverage should have put plaintiffs on 
notice of the purported fraud, and others going so far as to say that while loss causation 
may have been known at that point, facts supporting the element of scienter were not 
known until the results of governmental or regulatory investigations, including internal 
email messages, were made public.367
366 See, e.g., LC Capital Partners, LP v. Frontier Ins. Group, Inc., 318 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2003); In re 
NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1325-27 (3d Cir. 2002); Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 
2002); Franze v. Equitable Assurance, 296 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Inquiry notice is triggered 
by evidence of the possibility of fraud, not full exposition of the scam itself.”); Ritchey v. Horner, 244 F.3d 
635, 638-39 (8th Cir. 2001); Sterlin v. Biomune Sys., 154 F.3d 1191, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Inquiry 
notice ... triggers an investor's duty to exercise reasonable diligence, and ... the one-year statute of 
limitations period begins to run once the investor, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have 
discovered the facts underlying the alleged fraud.”); Marks v. CDW Computer Centers, Inc., 122 F.3d 363, 
367 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Not only must the investor be on notice of the need to conduct further inquiry, but the 
investor also must be able to learn the facts underlying the claim with the exercise of reasonable 
diligence.”); Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1155 (6th Cir. 1994).
367 See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Sup. 2d 351, 378-382 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (finding investors were put on inquiry notice of the fraud by specific media coverage exposing key 
elements of the plaintiffs’ claims and by defendants’ continued issuance of “buy” ratings despite substantial 
declines in the trading price of the stocks); In re Merrill Lynch Research Reports Sec. Litig., 289 F. Sup. 2d 
429 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (same); Pfeiffer v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 02Civ. 2912 (HB), 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11120, *14 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2003) (finding that lead plaintiff was on notice of facts constituting 
fraud as of date fourteen months before filing this suit, when he filed a substantially similar suit against 
some of the same defendants in state court); DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 309 F. Supp. 2d 631, 637 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that though element of loss causation may have been known by plaintiffs as early 
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In the only appellate decision on the topic, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
has refused to hold as a matter of law that a steep decline in the price of the relevant stock 
put plaintiffs on inquiry notice so as to trigger the statute of limitations.  In LaGrasta v. 
First Union National Bank,368 the appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal of 
the suit as time-barred.  In so doing, it noted there were numerous factual questions 
remaining to be answered before inquiry notice could be triggered on any date prior to 
June 2000, when a First Union analyst admitted her conflict of interest with respect to 
Ask Jeeves stock coverage in a Smart Money magazine article.369  As the suit had been 
filed in March 2001, it was permitted to proceed, at least until discovery might reveal 
better defense arguments on this point.370
The statute of limitations inquiry is necessarily a highly fact intensive question.  
Some guidance from the Eleventh Circuit will be helpful as to which statute applies, but 
the necessary definitive – for most analyst bias cases – word from the Second Circuit is 
as yet forthcoming.
Section IX – Conclusions
Indeed it is true that no easy or general conclusion can be drawn about whether 
so-called “analyst bias” gives rise to 10(b) liability.  The pending analyst bias suits vary 
as to the form their allegations have taken, and each case necessarily involves an ad hoc
examination of its unique facts.  While some seem to fit the 10b pattern quite easily, 
others raise interesting new questions of securities law and federal class action procedure.  
as 2000, but the element of scienter was not known until the intentional lie in the reports was revealed by 
the bad emails.
368
 358 F.3d 840 (11th Cir. 2004).
369 Id. at 848.
370 Id. at 851.
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What does appear to be clear is that allegedly tainted stock recommendations 
qualify as either material misrepresentations or omissions of material fact made in 
connection with a purchase or sale of securities.  Likewise, the scienter element likely 
will not pose a significant problem in those cases where there is either direct or 
circumstantial proof of an analyst’s opinion not being genuinely, where the relationship 
between analyst and issuer is quite tangled, or where there is some evidence of a quid pro 
quo arrangement between broker-dealer or analyst and the securities issuer of positive 
ratings for profitable investment banking business.
The biggest battles in this most recent securities law skirmish will be on the 
subjects of reliance and loss causation.  Individual reliance is generally not the case here, 
therefore analyst bias plaintiffs are depending on one or both available reliance 
presumptions.  While there is little question that the Affiliated Ute presumption applies 
where material omissions are alleged, the question of the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption’s applicability in those cases framed as material misrepresentations is 
thornier.  Existing precedent and the overall purpose and remedial function of the federal 
securities laws seems to favor application of the presumption to plaintiffs affected by 
analysts’ artificial price inflation, where a prima facie case can be shown that the 
analysts’ recommendations moved the market for the relevant security.  
Likewise, loss causation presents a novel question in this context, and especially 
given the Second Circuit’s checkered history with this element.  However, it looks as if 
that issue will also be resolved correctly by most courts in favor of permitting a jury to 
consider plaintiffs’ loss causation arguments.  Indeed, it will be the jury’s province then 
to determine what damages were in fact caused by any artificial price inflation caused by 
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analysts’ optimistic recommendations, and to separate from that what might have been an 
overall market effect in any given case.  This, of course, will be a highly fact dependent 
inquiry.  
When the millennium bubble burst, it generated new questions under 10b and 
created new interest in an important subset of securities fraud law – that involving non-
issuer communications with the investing public.  The congressional and regulatory 
reactions were almost immediate, hurriedly condemning research practices and somewhat 
vainly declaring the “dawn of a new day” on Wall Street. But the litigation of private 
actions alleging analyst and broker-dealer liability arising from biased stock research and 
recommendations will linger a bit longer.  It is from the jury verdicts and appellate 
opinions in these cases that we will answer the ultimate question – whether analysts in 
fact created or fueled the disastrous bubble and whether they should be responsible to 
investors. More importantly, in this process we will see yet another significant 
refinement of 10b jurisprudence.
